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ABSTRACT
Congress uses the income tax to achieve policy goals. States import
federal tax policies into their own tax systems when they incorporate
by reference the federal income tax base as the starting point for
assessment of state income taxes. But federal tax policies reflect
national, not state, political choices. This Article calls attention to the
practice of tax-base conformity and to its advantages and
disadvantages. Conformity conserves legislative, administrative, and
judicial resources, and it reduces taxpayers’ compliance burdens. At
the same time, however, conforming states cede tax autonomy to the
federal government, thereby jeopardizing federalism values, such as
regulatory diversity and diffusion of power. Conforming states also
expose themselves to revenue volatility stemming from the everchanging federal tax law. Despite these concerns, the administrative
and compliance advantages of federal-state tax-base conformity are so
significant that states are unlikely to abandon it. Thus, this Article

Copyright © 2013 Ruth Mason.
† Anthony J. Smits Professor of Global Commerce and Professor of Law, University of
Connecticut School of Law. For their helpful comments, I am grateful to Anders Christiansen,
Daniel Halperin, Wally Hellerstein, Daniel Hemel, Michael Knoll, Sarah Lawsky, Marty
McMahon, Katie Pratt, Alex Raskolnikov, David Schizer, Rich Schragger, Ted Seto, Kirk Stark,
Jeff Strnad, David Walker, Ethan Yale, George Yin, Larry Zelenak, faculty workshop
participants at Cornell Law School, University of Connecticut School of Law, University of
Florida College of Law, and University of Virginia School of Law, tax workshop participants at
Columbia Law School, Duke University School of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles, and
participants at the Yale Law Journal Reading Group and the Yale Law Women Reading
Group. Mike Aikins and Jarrod Shobe provided valuable research assistance.

MASON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1268

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/17/2013 6:54 PM

[Vol. 62:1267

makes only limited recommendations for reducing the adverse
impacts of tax-base conformity.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress uses tax incentives to regulate by rewarding socially
useful behavior with lower taxes and penalizing undesirable activities
with higher taxes. Deductions, exemptions, and tax credits reward
favored activities, such as charitable giving. Higher tax rates,
acceleration of tax liability, and denials of deductions, exemptions,
and tax credits penalize disfavored activities, such as early withdrawal
of retirement savings. Thus, Congress uses its taxing power to
influence behavior.
Whereas Congress uses tax incentives to affect the behavior of
private taxpayers, this Article argues that federal tax incentives also
affect the states because most states incorporate federal definitions of
income into their own tax laws. For example, the starting point for
calculating individual income taxes in almost all states is the
taxpayer’s federal “adjusted gross income” or “taxable income.” As
this Article explains, these federal income definitions reflect a variety
of controversial tax policy decisions made at the federal level. When
states incorporate by reference federal income definitions, states
automatically import federal tax policies into state law. Although
states set their own income tax rates, and although states deviate from
federal tax law on some issues, all state income taxes closely track the
federal tax base.
The usual reason given for federal-state tax-base conformity is
administrability. Assessing state income taxes upon the federal tax
base eases states’ legislative and enforcement burdens, and it reduces
taxpayers’ compliance burdens. This Article provides a fuller account
of the benefits of tax-base conformity. For example, state conformity
with the federal tax base results in states using the same tax bases as
each other—that is, federal-state tax-base conformity results in de
facto state tax-base harmonization. Among other advantages, state
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tax-base harmonization facilitates interstate commerce by reducing
transaction costs for taxpayers with economic activities in more than
one state. Harmonization also reduces the risk to taxpayers of double
state taxation, as well as the risk to states of tax-base erosion through
tax arbitrage. Finally, state bases that conform with the federal base
also likely contain fewer protectionist provisions or provisions that
discriminate against residents of other states than would
autonomously drafted state tax bases.
Although it generates many advantages, federal-state tax-base
conformity also presents disadvantages. For example, conforming
states cede tax autonomy to the federal government, thereby
potentially reducing states’ responsiveness to resident voters.
Furthermore, conformity jeopardizes the values served by federalism,
including regulatory diversity and diffusion of power. Finally,
conforming states also expose themselves to the revenue volatility
that stems from the ever-changing federal tax law.
Despite these disadvantages, federal-state tax-base conformity so
far has generated little controversy, perhaps because tax scholars tend
1
to focus on federal taxation to the exclusion of state taxation.
Although tax scholars have considered the fiscal federalism
implications of particular federal tax provisions that affect state
taxation, such as the federal deduction for state and local taxation,
federal-state tax-base conformity has not played a significant role in
2
fiscal federalism analysis. One commentator, however, recently
considered the democratic impact of federal-state tax-base

1. See Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 423
(2010) (calling base conformity “little discussed”). The last scholarly article that had tax-base
conformity as its principal topic was published in 1977. Otto G. Stolz & George A. Purdy,
Federal Collection of State Individual Income Taxes, 1977 DUKE L.J. 59. Stolz and Purdy’s
analysis is more limited than that provided in this Article because they focus on the now defunct
Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6361–65 (1988) (repealed 1990), under
which the federal government would collect income taxes on behalf of the states, provided that
the states substantially conformed their bases with the federal base. Stolz & Purdy, supra, at 61–
66.
2. For articles discussing the federal deduction for state and local taxes, see generally, for
example, Brian Galle, Federal Fairness to State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates,
and the “SALT” Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805 (2008); Louis Kaplow, Fiscal Federalism and
the Deductibility of State and Local Taxes Under the Federal Income Tax, 82 VA. L. REV. 413
(1996); Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975 (2011); and Kirk
J. Stark, Fiscal Federalism and Tax Progressivity: Should the Federal Income Tax Encourage
State and Local Redistribution?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1389 (2004).
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conformity. In an article primarily addressing international
delegation, Professor Michael Dorf used the example of federal-state
tax-base conformity to illustrate his argument that “upward
4
delegation[]” within a federal system raises fewer democratic
concerns than does upward delegation from a nation to a
5
supranational institution. Though Professor Dorf is undoubtedly
correct in this comparative analysis, at least three factors justify
taking a closer look at federal-state tax-base conformity. First is the
states’ growing reliance on income taxation in the face of declining
6
property tax revenues. Second is Congress’s growing tendency to use
7
the federal tax law to regulate, rather than simply to raise revenue.
Both of these factors tend to increase the regulatory impact in the
states of federal-state tax-base conformity. Finally, the current
divisive political environment may mean that national policy
preferences are more likely to diverge from state policy preferences.
After exploring the advantages and disadvantages of tax-base
conformity, this Article argues that the most important tool for
mitigating the adverse impact of federal-state tax-base conformity is
states’ ability to deviate from the federal tax base. Because no law
obliges states to conform to the federal tax base, states may terminate
8
conformity at any time. Moreover, states can deviate or “decouple”
from particular federal tax provisions on a case-by-case basis, which

3. Michael C. Dorf, Dynamic Incorporation of Foreign Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 153–
58 (2008).
4. Id. at 118.
5. Id. at 153–58.
6. See Kim Reuben & Carol Rosenberg, State and Local Revenues, 119 TAX NOTES 77, 78
(2008) (noting that from the 1970s to 2008, state personal income taxes as a share of all state and
local revenue, including local taxes, grew from 9 to 12 percent); see also TAX POLICY CTR., THE
TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE FOR THE 2008 ELECTION AND BEYOND, at
IV-1-4
(2008),
available
at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/upload/Statelocal/IV1STATEOFLOCALTAXPOLICY.final.pdf (providing detailed data and noting that state
personal income tax collections totaled $305 billion in 2008).
7. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, TAX
EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE
REEXAMINED 22–27 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05690.pdf (showing an
increase over time in the number and dollar value of federal tax expenditures). The most
dramatic recent example of regulation through the tax law is the enforcement through a tax
penalty of the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See I.R.C.
§ 5000A (Supp. V 2012) (imposing a tax penalty on certain individuals who fail to maintain
minimum essential health-care coverage).
8. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 7.02[1][a]
(3d ed. Supp. 2007) (discussing states’ decisions to deviate from or conform to federal bonus
depreciation in 2001).
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allows states to secure the principal advantages of base conformity
while retaining significant control over their fiscal systems. This
feature of tax-base conformity contrasts with other intergovernmental
cooperative mechanisms, such as international delegations or
9
conditional grants, which generally restrict deviations.
Notwithstanding the formal option to deviate, certain factors
tend to entrench federal tax law within the states. State deviations
from the federal tax base face political, procedural, and
administrative obstacles. One political obstacle is that after states
incorporate federal tax preferences into the state tax base, state
taxpayers come to rely on them, making them harder to repeal. In
particular, if state taxpayers view state deviations from federal tax
preferences as “tax increases,” this framing would discourage
deviations. In addition, deviations increase compliance and
enforcement costs for states and taxpayers. Despite these costs and
obstacles, all states have exercised their option to deviate (at least
somewhat) from the federal tax base.
But not all federal tax laws are created equal from the
perspective of states wishing to deviate. As a practical matter, some
federal tax provisions cannot easily be severed from the rest of the
federal tax base. Examples of nonseverable federal provisions include
10
the annual reporting requirement and the realization rule. It is not
practical for conforming states to deviate from such federal
provisions. Unfortunately, as this Article shows, because the degree
of entrenchment of a federal tax provision is not necessarily related to
its normative desirability, incorporating states will sometimes be
unable to deviate from federal tax rules that do not work well for the
11
state or that do not reflect the preferences of state voters.
The primary aims of this Article are positive; it analyzes the
practice of tax-base conformity with emphasis on its advantages and
disadvantages, and it seeks to explain why base conformity is both
widespread and entrenched. The first five parts of the Article tackle
these issues. Part I provides background on state conformity with the
federal individual income tax base. Although I focus on individual
12
taxation because of its revenue significance, many of my arguments

9. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 115–24.
10. For more on the realization rule, see infra Part III.A.1.
11. See infra Part V.C.
12. Excluding local taxes, in 2008, state individual income taxes accounted for 24 percent of
total state tax revenues, whereas corporate taxes accounted for 4 percent. The remainder of
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also apply to corporate taxes because many states also incorporate
13
the federal corporate tax base. Part II analyzes the advantages of
tax-base conformity. Part III analyzes its disadvantages. Part IV
considers the impact of base conformity on state tax competition. Part
V considers the extent to which states’ ability to decouple from
particular provisions of the federal tax law mitigates the
disadvantages of conformity, and it concludes that the entrenchment
of certain federal tax provisions limits states’ opportunities for
deviation. Although the primary purpose of this Article is to shed
light on the hidden impact of tax-base conformity, rather than to
make normative claims about conformity, Part VI nevertheless makes
limited policy recommendations for reducing some of the adverse
impacts of base conformity identified in Part III. Part VI also points
to avenues for future research that would expressly take base
conformity into account as an important aspect of both state tax
policy and fiscal federalism.
In making policy recommendations, Part VI assumes
(realistically) that the administrative and other advantages of tax-base
conformity are so substantial that states will not abandon conformity.
Part VI therefore considers other steps states can take to mitigate the
democracy and federalism concerns raised by conformity. For
example, conforming states should publish tax expenditure budgets,
which would alert voters and state officials to the costs of
incorporating federal tax subsidies. Likewise, rather than conforming
to the federal definition of “taxable income,” states instead should
14
conform to the federal definition of “adjusted gross income.”
Making this simple change would prevent states from automatically
incorporating federal itemized deductions that have clear regulatory
goals.
An implication of the analysis in this Article is that federal-state
fiscal interactions are more complex than is usually appreciated, and
specifically, that commentators have underestimated the influence of
the federal government on state tax policy. For example, although
many commentators (including myself) have commented on the

state revenue was from other sources, such as sales and gross-receipts taxes and utility revenues.
See TAX POLICY CTR., TAX FACTS: STATE AND LOCAL GENERAL REVENUE 2004–2010 (2012),
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=507.
13. For more on state conformity to the federal corporate tax base, see generally
HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 7.02–7.16 (Supp. 2007).
14. For a definition of “adjusted gross income,” see infra note 24 and accompanying text.
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absence of an active federal role in state taxation, this Article reveals
that the federal government wields substantial passive influence over
state taxation by defining the tax base.
Base conformity therefore should play a meaningful role in
16
federalism analysis and tax policy debates. Part VI shows that
explicit consideration of base conformity provides new insight into
old tax policy questions. For example, it provides new justification for
the federal deduction for state and local income taxes: the deduction
encourages states to raise revenue via a method that indirectly
bolsters federal policy. Base conformity considerations also reinforce
the argument that the preferred form for federal tax incentives should
be credits, rather than deductions or exemptions. Structuring federal
tax incentives as credits not only would assure that low-bracket
taxpayers receive the same benefits as high-bracket taxpayers, but it
also would minimize the regulatory impact of federal tax incentives at
the state level, given that the default under base conformity is that
states do not incorporate federal credits. Part VI discusses the impact
of base conformity on other important tax policies as well, including
the use of legislative sunsets and the possibility of adopting a federal
consumption tax. Finally, Part VI suggests specific avenues for
empirical research that would afford us a better understanding of the
role of base conformity in our fiscal federal system.
I. FEDERAL-STATE TAX-BASE CONFORMITY
To understand the regulatory impact of the federal tax base on
the states, it is important first to understand some technical aspects of
state tax bases. Forty-one states have broad-based individual income
taxes; two tax only unearned income, and seven states have no

15. See Walter Hellerstein, Georg W. Kofler & Ruth Mason, Constitutional Restraints on
Corporate Tax Integration, 62 TAX L. REV. 1, 57–58 (2008) (“Although . . . Congress has
occasionally imposed national rules affecting direct taxation . . . , states have largely been left to
their own devices . . . .”); see also Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will
Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171, 182–203 (1997) (studying empirically congressional
intervention in state taxation, but not considering conformity as a method of intervention);
Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV.
895, 952–54 (1992) (providing reasons as to why members of Congress are reluctant to intervene
directly to limit state taxing powers, even if doing so would increase efficiency).
16. This is currently not the case. For example, in a lengthy recent article, Professor David
Super only briefly considered tax-base conformity. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2594–98 (2005).
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17

The nine states without
individual income taxes at all.
comprehensive income taxes are not the principal subject of this
Article. But they demonstrate that it is possible for at least some
states to fund their public programs without reliance on income
18
taxation. As discussed in Part V.A., that some states have forgone
comprehensive income taxation shows that at least some states have a
19
viable alternative to federal-state tax-base conformity. This Part
focuses on the forty-one states with comprehensive income taxes, and
it describes how these states rely significantly on the federal tax base
for purposes of determining their residents’ income tax liability.
States conform their tax bases with that of the federal
government in a variety of ways. In the past, for example, some states
simply collected a fixed percentage of each resident’s federal tax
20
liability. This method represented perfect state conformity with the
federal base as well as its progressive rate structure. Today no state
directly piggybacks on the federal tax; that is, no state calculates its
21
income tax as a simple percentage of federal tax liability.
Instead, states conform to the federal tax base by incorporating
federal definitions of income into their own law. Thirty-five of the
forty-one states with broad-based income taxes use federal definitions
of income as the starting point for calculating residents’ taxable
22
income. Twenty-nine states start with federal “adjusted gross
23
income” (AGI). Federal AGI is federal gross income after so-called
above-the-line deductions for such items as contributions to selfemployed retirement plans, alimony payments, individual retirement
account (IRA) contributions, moving expenses, and certain

17. See RICK OLIN & SANDY SWAIN, WIS. LEGISLATIVE FISCAL BUREAU,
INFORMATIONAL PAPER 4, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS IN THE STATES 1–2 (2011),
available at http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2011/
4_individual%20income%20tax%20provisions%20in%20the%20states.pdf.
18. Seven states—Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming—do not tax income at all, and another two states—New Hampshire and Tennessee—
tax only unearned income. Id. Although the two states that tax only unearned income rely on
federal tax laws, they do so to a much lesser extent than do states with comprehensive income
taxes. See generally id. at 14–57 (providing an overview of each state’s income tax provisions).
19. See infra Part V.A.
20. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).
21. Id.
22. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57.
23. Id.
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educational expenses, such as payments of student-loan interest. In
contrast with the majority of states that start with federal AGI, six
states use as their starting point federal “taxable income,” which is
federal AGI less personal exemptions and either the standard
25
deduction or itemized deductions. Because states that begin their
income calculations with federal taxable income automatically
incorporate federal itemized deductions into their tax bases, they
generally will conform more closely to the federal tax base than states
using federal AGI as their starting point. Nevertheless, most states
that use federal AGI as their starting point still permit taxpayers to
take personal exemptions and to elect either a standard deduction or
26
itemized deductions. Most states, including those that use federal
AGI as their starting point, at least partially conform their itemized
27
deductions to the federal itemized deductions.
States adopt federal definitions of income in either a static or
dynamic fashion. States with static, or “fixed-date,” incorporation
28
adopt the federal tax base as it existed at a certain point in time,
whereas states with dynamic, or “rolling,” incorporation use current
federal tax law as the starting point for their determinations of

24. For a simple explanation of above-the-line deductions, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. 17, YOUR FEDERAL INCOME TAX: FOR INDIVIDUALS 123–42 (2011), available at http://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p17.pdf.
25. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57.
26. See id. at 5 (noting that thirty-four states had standard deductions in 2009).
27. Many states offer itemized deductions identical to the federal itemized deductions. See
id. at 11 tbl.4 (detailing each state’s degree of conformity with federal itemized deductions).
Only eleven states with broad-based income taxes did not conform at least partially with federal
itemized deductions. Of these eleven, ten did not have to specify autonomously the content of
state itemized deductions because they completely disallowed itemized deductions. Id.
28. For example, South Carolina incorporates federal tax law statically. See S.C. CODE
ANN. § 12-6-40(A)(1)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2012) (“Except as otherwise provided, ‘Internal
Revenue Code’ means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended through December 31,
2011, and includes the effective date provisions contained in it.”).
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taxable income. Fewer than half the states with income taxes
30
incorporate federal law dynamically.
Although states begin their income calculations with either
federal AGI or federal taxable income, all states deviate, or decouple,
from particular provisions of the federal tax law. For example, states
typically require residents to add back the federal-level deduction for
31
the payment of state and local income taxes. Likewise, although the
federal government allows taxpayers to exempt interest from all state
and local bonds, most states require residents to add back interest
32
earned on out-of-state bonds.
In addition to making upward adjustments to residents’ income,
many states also provide deductions that are unavailable at the
federal level. For example, several states allow residents to deduct
33
their federal taxes. Other common state adjustments include
allowing state residents to subtract federally taxable Social Security
34
benefits and retirement or pension income. States use such special
tax provisions to attract residents and to advance other policy goals
and preferences. For example, in a provision that presumably aims to
promote Mississippi casinos, Mississippi provides a special itemized
deduction for gambling losses, but it limits the deduction to losses
35
incurred at Mississippi-licensed gaming establishments.
After calculating state-taxable income, a state determines a
resident’s state tax liability by applying its tax rates. Each state

29. For example, Massachusetts incorporates federal tax law dynamically. See MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 63, § 1 (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (defining “gross income” for state tax
purposes as “gross income as defined under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, as
amended and in effect for the taxable year”). Ten states clearly forbid dynamic incorporation of
federal law as a violation of state constitutional nondelegation principles. See Dorf, supra note
3, at 109 n.14. The constitutions of twelve states explicitly permit dynamic incorporation of
federal tax law. Id. Courts in yet other states have approved dynamic incorporation of federal
tax law even in the absence of express constitutional authorization. Id.
30. See generally OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17 (compiling data indicating that, of the
forty-one states with broad-based taxes, fifteen adopt the current tax code as their starting
point, six do not officially use a federal starting point, and the remainder incorporate statically).
31. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2013) (“There shall be
added to federal adjusted gross income: . . . [i]nterest income on obligations of any state other
than this state . . . to the extent not properly includible in federal adjusted gross income . . . .”).
33. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 & n.16 (Supp. 2003).
34. See RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT INCOME: TAX YEAR 2010, at 3
(2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/TaxonPensions2011.pdf.
35. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-17(3)(a) (2010).
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chooses its own tax rates. Tax credits provide another opportunity for
states to tailor their tax base to local conditions and preferences.
States provide tax credits for a wide variety of taxpayer expenditures,
including spending on historic preservation, job training, investment
36
in energy-saving technologies, organ donation, and adoption. In
addition, to prevent double state-level taxation, all states that tax
37
income allow credits for taxes that their residents pay to other states.
Many states also incorporate federal tax credits. For example, like the
38
federal government, many states offer an earned income tax credit.
Of the forty-one states with comprehensive income taxes, six
employ neither federal AGI nor federal taxable income as the
39
starting point for their income calculations. I refer to these states as
“facially nonconforming.” Although their income definitions are not
formally tied to the federal definitions of income, these states
nevertheless rely significantly on federal tax law and concepts. For
example, instead of beginning their income calculations with a
resident’s federal AGI or federal taxable income, facially nonconforming states typically begin the calculation by requiring a
taxpayer to list her wages as stated on her federal Form W-2, together
with amounts reported on federal Forms 1099 and similar federal tax
40
forms. These states also typically require a taxpayer to report
business income in the same way as she reported it on her federal
41
Schedule C, and they typically rely on the federal Schedule D for
42
purposes of calculating capital gains and losses. Since the amounts
36. For detailed descriptions of the tax incentives offered by each state, see generally OLIN
& SWAIN, supra note 17.
37. Id. at 6.
38. See id. (noting that twenty-one states have an earned income tax credit).
39. See id. at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49 (gathering data on the deviations between the federal tax
base and the tax bases of the six facially nonconforming states—Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa,
Mississippi, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).
40. E.g., ARKANSAS 2010 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS 13–14
(2010), available at http://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/incomeTax/individual/Documents/
LongBooklet_2010.pdf.
41. See, e.g., id. at 14 (requiring state taxpayers to report the amount reported on federal
Schedule C for business and farm income); see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27,
36, 41 (detailing the significant conformity between five of the six facially nonconforming states
and the federal government in reporting of business income). Among facially nonconforming
states, Pennsylvania is the exception. It has its own schedules for business, rental, and farm
income. See id. at 49.
42. See, e.g., ARKANSAS 2010 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 40, at 14; see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49 (noting certain
deviations between the calculation of capital gains and losses between the federal government
and facially nonconforming states, but also noting that in two of the six states, the federal and
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stated on such federal tax forms are calculated by reference to federal
tax rules, they reflect federal tax policies. Thus, although these states
do not adopt federal income definitions formally, their tax bases
substantially conform to the federal tax base, including by allowing
43
state residents federal exemptions and other tax benefits.
II. ADVANTAGES OF TAX-BASE CONFORMITY
Federal-state tax-base conformity generates what might be called
vertical harmonization benefits. By minimizing differences between
the state and federal tax bases, conformity eases taxpayer compliance,
enhances state enforcement efforts, and conserves state legislative
44
resources.
Similarly, by minimizing interstate tax base differences, tax-base
conformity also secures what might be called horizontal
harmonization benefits. Among other benefits, harmonization of
state tax bases facilitates interstate commerce, and it may discourage
states from enacting protectionist taxes. This Part discusses the
vertical and horizontal benefits of tax-base conformity. Although this
Part is primarily descriptive, the benefits it describes should also be
understood to create pressure for states to conform.
A. Vertical Harmonization Benefits
Tax-base conformity generates benefits from vertical
harmonization of the federal and state tax bases. These are
advantages that arise from the states having the same tax base as the
federal government. For example, by requiring state residents to
report the same amount for state tax purposes as they report for
45
federal tax purposes, states reduce taxpayers’ compliance costs.
state calculations are identical). Again, Pennsylvania is the exception. Although it calculates
capital gains and losses in the same way as the federal government, it allows taxpayers to take
all losses in the year incurred, as compared with the federal government, which allows taxpayers
to offset at most $3000 annually of net capital losses against ordinary income. Compare 72 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 3402-307(E) (West 1995) (providing unlimited deduction for losses on “any
transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with the trade or business”), with
I.R.C. § 1211 (2006) (limiting to $3000 the amount of net capital losses that may be applied to
reduce ordinary income each year).
43. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:8A-35 (West 2002) (allowing New Jersey taxpayers
itemized deductions for charitable contributions and casualty losses but not for other federal
itemized deductions).
44. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 125–27.
45. State courts reviewing incorporations of federal law for consistency with state
nondelegation doctrines have acknowledged the administrative gains from following federal
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Although empirical studies have not specifically estimated the
46
compliance cost savings from tax-base conformity, conformity avoids
the need for taxpayers to calculate their income twice or to keep two
sets of records. Instead, state taxpayers calculate their federally
taxable income, and then they use this amount to file both federal and
state taxes. Electronic filing programs even allow taxpayers to file
47
federal and state forms together. By reducing tax complexity in this
48
way, conformity promotes voluntary compliance. Moreover, because
federal tax definitions and concepts are subject to frequent judicial
and regulatory interpretation, they possess a degree of legal certainty
49
that reduces transaction and planning costs.
Conformity also aids state tax enforcement goals by enabling
states to free ride on the elaborate federal administrative mechanisms
for enforcing federal tax laws. These mechanisms include federal
50
withholding, auditing, and third-party reporting requirements.
Exchange-of-information agreements between the states and the
federal government allow the states to learn of federal deficiency

rules and definitions. For example, in upholding the constitutionality of a state statute that
incorporated the federal corporate tax base, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted the
“convenience to the taxpayer and economy to the state.” First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of New
Haven v. Connelly, 115 A.2d 455, 460 (Conn. 1955). Similarly, in discussing Alaska’s system of
determining state tax liability by reference to federal liability, the Alaska Supreme Court noted
that the system “was aimed at convenience to the taxpayer and simplicity of administration.”
Hickel v. Stevenson, 416 P.2d 236, 239 (Alaska 1966).
46. Cf. W. Bartley Hildreth, Matthew N. Murray & David L. Sioquist, Interstate Tax
Uniformity and the Multistate Tax Commission, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 575, 580–88 (2005) (lamenting
the “sparse and not comprehensive” empirical evidence of corporate compliance costs due to
nonuniformity of tax bases across the states but hypothesizing that corporate compliance costs
would be higher without federal base conformity).
47. See Harley Duncan & LeAnn Luna, Lending a Helping Hand: Two Governments Can
Work Together, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 663, 672 (2007) (describing the FedState E-file program).
48. HARLEY T. DUNCAN, FED’N OF TAX ADMINS., RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FEDERAL
AND STATE INCOME TAXES 6 (2005), available at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/
taxreformpanel.pdf; cf. Richard D. Pomp, Restructuring a State Income Tax in Response to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, 36 TAX NOTES 1195, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that base conformity
provides states an important opportunity for tax simplification).
49. Cf. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 719–29 (1997) (discussing
network and learning effects in the context of standard forms and boilerplate; for example,
frequent judicial interpretation of widely used contract terms reduces the legal uncertainty
associated with those terms).
50. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 70–72, 75 n.76 (detailing state-federal cooperation in
enforcement, including, for example, cooperative audits, information-sharing agreements, and
exchange of personnel).
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determinations made against their residents. The federal and state
governments also exchange information about the amounts
52
individuals file at each level to ensure that they match. States can
use this information to assess their own deficiencies or to begin an
audit. By increasing the chances of detection, these shared
enforcement mechanisms may make taxpayers less inclined to
underreport their income to either level of government.
Additionally, by relying on the federal tax base, states avoid
expending scarce legislative resources on devising and maintaining
53
their own bases. Similarly, state revenue departments can rely on tax
liability determinations made by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
54
and federal courts (including the specialized Tax Court), and
conformity enables states to avoid duplicating certain tasks handled
by the Treasury Department, such as writing tax regulations. Because
conforming states can rely on expert federal tax legislative drafting,
regulatory interpretation, and adjudication, conformity allows states
to reduce their investment in developing expertise in income
55
taxation. To the extent that state employees need income tax
expertise, base conformity makes it useful for states to allow their
56
employees to participate in IRS training sessions. Finally, conformity
may provide political cover to state lawmakers, who can shift the
blame to Congress for unpopular state tax policies imported from the
federal tax base.
B. Horizontal Harmonization Benefits
Federal-state tax-base conformity also results in significant tax
57
harmonization among the states, which produces benefits of its own.

51. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 668–72 (describing corporate tax information
sharing in both directions: from the federal government to the states and vice versa).
52. See id. at 670 (discussing states’ nascent participation in the State Reverse File Match
Initiative).
53. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 133–35 (detailing legislative costs, including salaries, costs of
attaining sufficient expertise to write effective legislation, and the costs of “adjusting the law to
changing circumstances” at the federal level).
54. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02[1] (Supp. 2003) (discussing
the legal effect in various states of federal-level tax-deficiency determinations).
55. See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1199 (“[M]any state tax provisions require a higher order
of administrative capacity than actually exists.”).
56. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 673 (noting that the IRS allows state employees
to participate in its training programs on a space-available basis).
57. The federal tax base serves as a Schelling point for the states—it is the base each state
expects the others to use, even in the absence of express coordination among the states or
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For example, it reduces the likelihood that cross-border taxpayers will
experience unrelieved double state taxation, and it protects state tax
bases by reducing opportunities for cross-border tax arbitrage.
Finally, as compared to a situation in which each state autonomously
devised its own tax base, adoption by the states of the federal tax base
probably promotes tax subsidization of taxpayer activities whose
positive benefits spill over to other states. Similarly, conformity also
may reduce state tendencies to enact tax bases that either
discriminate against residents of other states or otherwise impose
negative externalities on other states.
1. Facilitates Interstate Commerce. Harmonization of tax bases
across the states helps people anticipate how they will be taxed if they
move or expand their business or investment into another state. By
thus reducing learning costs associated with cross-border movements,
federal-state tax-base conformity may facilitate interstate commerce
and the growth of multistate enterprises.
2. Reduces Double Taxation. Double taxation occurs when
multiple states claim to be the source of the same item of income or
when the income is sourced in one state, but owned by a taxpayer
who resides in another state. For example, when a law professor
resides in Connecticut, but earns income in New York, both states
58
have jurisdiction to tax him on that income. If both states exercise
their tax jurisdiction, and if Connecticut does not relieve the resulting
double taxation by crediting New York’s tax, the unrelieved double
taxation will discourage cross-border work, raising both practical and
59
constitutional problems. Conformity may help reduce double state
taxation because states’ methods for avoiding double taxation,
including apportionment and crediting, work best when all states use
between the states and the federal government. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE
STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–57 & n.1 (1960) (describing the idea that people tend to converge
on “focal points,” even in the absence of communication). One way Professor Schelling
illustrated this idea was by asking a group of students what they would do if they arranged to
meet a friend tomorrow in New York City, but they did not specify where or when; most
students responded that they would go to the information booth at Grand Central Station at
noon. Id.
58. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003) (involving a
Connecticut-resident law professor with New York-source income).
59. Double taxation of individuals may violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the dormant Commerce Clause. See generally HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶
4.14–4.16 (Supp. 2009); see also id. ¶ 20.06 (Supp. 2003 & Supp. 2012). If so, as the residence
state, Connecticut would be obliged to credit the taxes assessed by New York. See id.
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the same tax base. For example, when all states use the same rules for
60
sourcing income, double state taxation is less likely to occur.
3. Prevents Tax Arbitrage. Tax arbitrage encompasses taxplanning devices that exploit differences in the tax laws of two
61
different jurisdictions. Whereas differences in state tax bases create
62
tax-planning opportunities for both individual and corporate
63
taxpayers, federal-state tax-base conformity may reduce deadweight
loss from tax arbitrage by minimizing differences in state tax bases.

60. See, e.g., Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 845 (noting that Professor Zelinsky would not have
suffered unrelieved double state taxation if Connecticut adopted the same “convenience of the
employer” test as New York; in other words, double taxation would not have arisen if
Connecticut and New York had the same tax base, including the same sourcing rules); see also
Shaviro, supra note 15, at 912 (discussing state tax relief for double taxation); cf. John F. Avery
Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 17–19 (1999) (describing so-called
qualification conflicts, which arise under double tax treaties when two countries have different
definitions of income or different national-law characterizations of the same item of income).
61. See H. David Rosenbloom, International Tax Arbitrage and the “International Tax
System,” 53 TAX L. REV. 137, 142 (2000) (describing “international tax arbitrage” as “a lofty
term that refers to taking advantage of differences among country tax systems, usually
differences in addressing a common tax question” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also,
e.g., Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, Tax Competition and Leviathan, 40 EUR. ECON. REV.
113, 117 (1996) (incorporating an arbitrage condition into an econometric model of tax
coordination).
62. For example, although most states incorporate federal rules for determining capital
gains and losses, some calculate capital income differently from the federal government. See,
e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-51-815(b) (2012) (excluding up to 30 percent of net long-term
capital gains); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.30(1)(p) (West 2003 & Supp. 2012) (providing senior
citizens an annual deduction—of $9,420 for single returns and $18,840 for joint returns—for
interest, dividends, and capital gains); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-30.3(2)(d) (2011) (excluding up
to 30 percent of net long-term capital gains); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-1150(A) (2000 & Supp.
2012) (excluding 44 percent of long-term capital gains). Several other states—including
Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, and Kansas—have capital-gains preferences only for certain instate assets. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 18–19, 24, 28. Taxpayers can exploit these
differences by manipulating where they reside or where they realize gains and losses.
63. For example, Delaware deviates from the federal corporate tax base by exempting
certain income from intangible assets. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (2009). In
response, many multistate corporations transfer their valuable intangibles to holding companies
that they establish in Delaware. See Lawrence Bajor, The Slow Death of State Tax Arbitrage, J.
ST. TAX’N, July–Aug. 2007, at 35, 37 (2007) (evaluating the use of Delaware holding companies
in state tax planning). This structure allows multistate companies to reduce their taxable income
in other states (by paying deductible licensing fees to their Delaware intangibles holding
company) while generating no taxable income in Delaware (because the licensing fees are
exempt there). Delaware’s deviation from the federal tax base succeeded in making it a
destination for intangible assets held by multistate corporations, but it also generated significant
litigation as well as defensive legislative responses from several other states attempting to shore
up their eroded tax bases. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶¶ 6.11, 6.13 (Supp.
2006) (reviewing states’ jurisdiction to tax out-of-state intangible property).
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4. Encourages Cross-Border Spillovers. To the extent that
federal tax law reflects the larger territorial scope of federal interests,
federal tax provisions probably reward behaviors whose benefits spill
over to other states more than would autonomously drafted state tax
64
bases. If this is so, then by adopting the federal tax base, states
amplify the salutary effects of any federal tax laws that subsidize
interjurisdictional spillovers. For example, the federal deduction for
deposits to traditional IRAs aims to encourage taxpayers to save for
retirement. The withdrawal in retirement of the earnings from
traditional IRAs is federally taxable, which serves partially to
65
mitigate the federal revenue loss associated with the deduction.
When transferred to the state level, this same tax incentive carries an
additional risk for any state adopting it. The risk derives from the
possibility that the saver will transfer his or her state of residence
before withdrawing the earnings in the account. Should the saver
migrate, the state that subsidized the deposit may lose the
opportunity to tax the withdrawal because the taxpayer is no longer a
resident. In this way, the subsidy funded by the state in which the
taxpayer spends her working years may spill over to the state in which
she retires.
Even though such interjurisdictional spillovers may be salutary
from a national perspective, states presumably would be less likely to
subsidize them if they constructed their tax bases from scratch. If they
defined their tax bases from scratch, even states wanting to subsidize
savings presumably would structure their savings incentives
differently from the federal government. For example, instead of
providing an up-front deduction for deposits to retirement accounts,
states might structure their savings incentives as exemptions of
66
withdrawals from such accounts. By delaying the timing of the
subsidy to the taxpayer’s retirement years, the state thereby would

64. Examples of federal tax provisions that promote behaviors with national benefits
include, among others, incentives for saving, education, investment in green technologies, the
purchase of private health-insurance coverage, and special tax benefits available to military
personnel.
65. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (imposing a 10 percent additional tax on early
distributions).
66. Although most states conform with the federal treatment of IRAs, Pennsylvania, a
facially nonconforming state, denies deductions or exclusions for contributions by account
owners to their traditional and Roth IRAs, but it exempts qualified distributions from both
traditional and Roth IRAs. See PENN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, REV-636 PO (02-12),
RETIREMENT: TRADITIONAL IRAS AND ROTH IRAS (2012), available at http://www.portal.
state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_2_818161_0_0_18/rev636.pdf.
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avoid the risk of subsidizing savings of taxpayers who will retire
elsewhere. If avoiding the spillover means that a state does not
provide a tax subsidy at all, or that it provides a tax subsidy in a less
effective manner, nonconformity may reduce national welfare. The
federal tax law contains many incentives for behaviors that create
positive externalities whose benefits are not limited to any particular
state. These include incentives for education, military service, and
67
reducing pollution and carbon emissions. By incorporating these
incentives into their own tax bases through conformity with the
federal
base,
states
provide
additional
incentives
for
68
interjurisdictional spillovers.
For the same reasons, base conformity also may reduce states’
use of “not-in-my-backyard” (NIMBY) taxes. That is, conformity
may dampen states’ urge to overtax socially productive, but noxious,
69
activities, such as radioactive waste disposal.
5. Discourages Tax Exportation and Protectionist Taxation. In
the same vein, conformity may reduce the extent to which states use
their tax laws to impose negative externalities on residents of other
70
states. For example, compared to conforming bases, autonomously
drafted state tax bases presumably would contain more provisions
aimed at exporting tax burdens to residents of other states. The goal
to export taxes to nonresidents can be illustrated with an example
from international tax. A country may collect what is arguably more
than its fair share of tax from nonresidents who have minimal
contacts with its territory. For example, instead of taxing them only
on their winnings from tournaments in Britain, the United Kingdom
taxes nonresident athletes on a share of their worldwide endorsement

67. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 221 (providing a deduction for student-loan interest).
68. Whether such additional incentives are salutary depends on the elasticity of the
behavior and the degree of the federal subsidy.
69. Cf. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Designing Tax Policy in Federalist
Economies: An Overview, 60 J. PUB. ECON. 307, 314, 318–22 (1996) (noting that state tax
autonomy provides room for NIMBY taxation and suggesting solutions).
70. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1499 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN
(1987)) (arguing that allowing states discretion to set their own product-liability law “created a
liability monster,” where each state sought to benefit resident plaintiffs while imposing costs on
nonresident defendants).
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income, even if they only participate in a single competition in
71
Britain.
Other examples of attempts to export taxes can be drawn from
state indirect taxation. For example, states may impose high hotel
taxes or natural-resource severance taxes because they believe that
the economic burden of such taxes will fall primarily on nonresidents
72
who lack political representation in the taxing state. Because
residents of all states have representation in the federal government,
however, federal law is less likely than state law to contain provisions
that aim to shift tax burdens from residents of one state to residents
of another.
As compared to a hypothetical state income tax devised
autonomously by state legislators, the federal tax base also can be
expected to contain fewer provisions that protect the residents of any
particular state from competition from residents of other states. This
is because the temptation to use the tax system to prefer one state
73
over another is weaker at the national level than at the state level.
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the dormant Commerce

71. Until 2012, the United Kingdom calculated its share of a nonresident’s global
endorsement income by a fractional method. The global income was multiplied by the number
of days spent competing in British tournaments divided by the number of days spent competing
globally. See Usain Bolt’s Tax Lesson, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2012, at A10. This calculation
arguably overtaxed athletes whose activities in Britain were limited to competition. Since 2012,
the United Kingdom has calculated its share of nonresidents’ income by taking into
consideration days of performance or training in the United Kingdom divided by global days of
performance or training. Compared to the 2010 rule, this formula generally will result in more
income being allocated to the athlete’s country of residence, and less to the United Kingdom.
See Tony Nitti, One Reason the NFL Will Never Permanently Relocate a Team to London: The
U.K.’s Tax Treatment of Nonresident Athletes, FORBES (Oct. 29, 2012, 10:14 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2012/10/29/one-reason-the-nfl-will-never-permanentlyrelocate-a-team-to-london-the-u-k-s-tax-treatment-of-nonresident-athletes/.
72. Cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–29 (1981) (rejecting a
claim that Montana’s coal-severance tax violated the Commerce Clause by exporting tax
burdens to residents of other states). Whether taxes, such as severance taxes or hotel taxes,
actually export tax burdens to nonresidents depends on their incidence, which is notoriously
difficult to determine. See Charles E. McLure, Jr., Incidence Analysis and the Supreme Court:
An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 69, 80 (1982) (noting
that “any tax levied on a product that is sold primarily to non-residents” is not necessarily an
exported tax, as it depends on who actually bears the economic burden of the tax). Even if not
successful in exporting tax burdens, however, taxes that states intend to serve as export taxes
can be harmful. See Shaviro, supra note 15, at 927–28 (noting that states with such taxes spend
more than the national average, perhaps due to the belief that residents do not bear the
incidence of such taxes).
73. The federal tax base may reflect population bias in congressional voting rules. See infra
Part VI.C.
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imperfect
Clause to prohibit protectionist state taxation,
enforcement of that constitutional norm leaves room for gains from
75
tax-base conformity. Similarly, compared to autonomously drafted
state tax bases, conforming bases probably contain fewer provisions
76
designed to attract mobile residents from other states.
6. Helps Identify Unconstitutional Tax Discrimination. A final
benefit of tax-base conformity is that it could help taxpayers identify
discriminatory state tax provisions that are ripe for constitutional
challenge. For the reasons explained in the last subsection,
discriminatory state tax provisions that violate the dormant
Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause are likely
to take the form of deviations from the federal tax base. State
deviation from the federal base results in special reporting by the
taxpayer on state tax forms, and this special reporting increases the
political salience of the divergence of state and federal tax policy. For
example, the itemized deduction that Mississippi grants for gambling
losses distinguishes between gambling losses incurred in Mississippi
77
gaming establishments and those incurred in other states. This
distinction may unconstitutionally discriminate against out-of-state
78
gaming establishments. As a deviation from the federal tax code,
claiming the deduction for in-state gambling losses requires special

74. See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (“The modern law of
what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about economic
protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by
burdening out-of-state competitors.” (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
273–74 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
75. Problems with enforcement stem from, inter alia, difficulties in identifying a party with
standing to challenge such legislation. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332
(2006) (vacating, for lack of standing, the Sixth Circuit’s judgment in Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler,
Inc., 386 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2004), which held that an Ohio business tax credit discriminated
against interstate commerce); see also Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 405–
22 (1996) (discussing judicial standing obstacles to dormant Commerce Clause challenges of
state tax incentives that distort interstate commerce). Such state tax incentives take the form of
deviations from the federal tax base. See infra Part IV.
76. Cf. Enrich, supra note 75, at 406, 467 (arguing that the Supreme Court should strike
down as violations of the dormant Commerce Clause state tax incentives designed to poach
business from other states). For the other side of the argument, see infra Part IV.
77. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
78. The Supreme Court has given potentially discriminatory subsidies, like the Mississippi
deduction, less scrutiny than potentially discriminatory taxes. See, e.g., New Energy, 486 U.S. at
278 (distinguishing between discriminatory taxes and direct subsidies for domestic industry).
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reporting on Mississippi tax forms, which increases the salience of
the deduction. Although not all state tax deviations are
discriminatory, their high salience may increase the likelihood of a
constitutional challenge to those that are discriminatory, which may,
in turn, discourage states from enacting discriminatory deviations in
the first place.
III. DISADVANTAGES OF TAX-BASE CONFORMITY
By incorporating federal definitions of income into their own tax
laws, states delegate to the federal government authority over
important aspects of their fiscal systems. As a result, tax-base
conformity has generated legal challenges under the nondelegation
80
principles of many states’ constitutions, and several states have
specific provisions in their constitutions to accommodate federal tax81
base conformity.
Rather than analyzing whether tax-base conformity violates state
constitutions or other state laws, however, this Part assumes that state
incorporation of the federal tax base is legal in order to analyze the
disadvantages of tax-base conformity. Section A explains how taxbase conformity reduces state tax autonomy. Section B considers how
the harmonization that results from tax-base conformity undermines
79. MISS. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FORM 80-108, ADJUSTMENTS & CONTRIBUTIONS 1 (2012)
available at http://www.dor.ms.gov/docs/indiv_80108128.pdf.
80. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 108–11 (reviewing the status of tax-base conformity under
state nondelegation doctrines). Compare Commonwealth v. Warner Bros. Theatres, Inc., 27
A.2d 62, 63–64 (Pa. 1942) (upholding dynamic incorporation of the federal definition of net
income against nondelegation challenge), with Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588,
593 (Minn. 1971) (holding that dynamic incorporation of federal tax law would violate the
Minnesota Constitution’s nondelegation principle). Static incorporation of federal tax law
generally does not constitute a delegation of state legislative power, but dynamic incorporation
may. Several state courts have held that even dynamic federal-state tax-base conformity does
not represent a legislative delegation. For example, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
This is not a delegation of legislative power but an incorporation by reference of the
federal law into the state law. State law lays a tax on the franchise or privilege of a
corporation to do business in this state. The state legislature and not the Congress has
selected net earnings as the base for determining the amount of this tax and has fixed
the rate to be paid on that tax base. As a matter of convenience to the taxpayer and
economy to the state, the legislature has adopted some of the standards [including the
definition of gross income] employed in the federal corporation net income tax law.
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of New Haven v. Connelly, 115 A.2d 455, 459–60 (Conn. 1955)
(citations omitted).
81. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (“In enacting any law imposing a tax on or
measured by income, the legislature may define income by reference to provisions of the laws of
the United States as they may be or become effective at any time or from time to time, whether
retrospective or prospective in their operation.”).
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federalism values, such as diffusion of power and regulatory diversity.
Finally, Section C shows that the loss of state tax autonomy under
base conformity causes fiscal volatility because states that
dynamically incorporate federal tax law open themselves to revenue
shocks from changes in federal law.
Two factors tend to mitigate the disadvantages of federal-state
tax-base conformity. First, because the regulatory impact of taxation
is a function of both the base and the rate, by retaining control over
their tax rates, states retain an important fiscal policy tool. Second,
states can (and do) deviate from federal tax provisions. Later, in Part
V, I will argue that the ability of the states to deviate from federal tax
law significantly mitigates the disadvantages of tax-base conformity.
For purposes of identifying and describing those disadvantages,
however, this Part assumes complete federal-state tax-base
conformity.
A. State Tax Autonomy
When states conform to the federal tax base, they cede to the
federal government at least three kinds of authority. First, they
relinquish the ability to determine structural and definitional aspects
of their income taxes, such as whether to tax imputed income and
how to treat married taxpayers. Second, they cede authority to
determine tax incentives. Finally, tax-base conformity allows the
federal government to set the policy agenda for state income taxation.
1. Structure and Definition of Income. By conforming their tax
bases to that of the federal government, states voluntarily cede
control over decisions about the structure of their income taxes and
about how to define income. Structural and income-defining decisions
are those a government must make to assess income taxes, even if it
does not intend to use tax incentives to regulate behavior. These
decisions include who should be taxed, how often, and how to define
income. If these questions had uncontroversial answers, then ceding
structural and income-defining tax authority to the federal
government would be unproblematic. In reality, these questions
involve a large set of well-known and controversial issues.
For example, federal law does not tax imputed income. Imputed
income includes the value of services a taxpayer provides for herself
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and the value of using capital assets that she owns. For instance,
when a taxpayer resides in a house that she owns, she has imputed
rental income. Taxing all imputed income is impossible because we
cannot accurately estimate the amount of each taxpayer’s imputed
income. But many have criticized the inequities caused by the failure
to tax at least those sources of imputed income that could be taxed
83
reasonably accurately, such as imputed rental income. By adopting
the federal tax base, states defer to federal choices, including the
decision not to tax imputed rental income, even though the
experiences of other countries have shown that taxing imputed rental
income is administrable and can reduce tax inequities between
84
otherwise similarly situated renters and homeowners.
Likewise, the federal tax system generally does not tax
85
appreciation until disposition of the appreciated asset. Under this
“realization rule,” taxpayers accumulating wealth in the form of asset
appreciation need not pay tax currently, whereas taxpayers who earn
86
income from work cannot defer tax. The realization rule thereby
regressively shifts the tax burden away from those with asset
appreciation. As with imputed income, the primary justifications for
the realization rule are practical impediments, such as valuation and
liquidity problems. Specifically, because we often do not know the
exact value of an asset until its sale, we cannot accurately tax it until
then. Likewise, if appreciation were taxed before disposition of the
appreciated asset, taxpayers might not have the cash to pay the tax.
82. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 124 (5th ed. 2005).
83. Because federal law does not tax imputed rental income, for example, homeowners pay
less tax than similarly situated renters, who must pay their rent with after-tax income. For
historical analysis of this issue, see Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History
and Critique of the Tax Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 255–70
(2010).
84. See, e.g., HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 181–83 (2010) (noting that although many countries have been moving
away from taxing imputed rental income for administrative reasons, the Netherlands has
retained its imputed rental tax); see also Paul E. Merz, Foreign Income Tax Treatment of the
Imputed Rental Value of Owner-Occupied Housing: Synopsis and Commentary, 30 NAT’L TAX J.
435, 435 (1977) (noting that in the mid-1970s, forty-two countries taxed imputed rental income);
cf. Ventry, supra note 83, at 256–57 (noting that acknowledgment of the regressive nature of the
home mortgage deduction prompted federal lawmakers in the United States to consider taxing
imputed rental income); id. at 257 (discussing solutions to the practical obstacles to taxing
imputed rental income and noting that Wisconsin “experimented with taxing net [imputed]
rental income under its income tax”).
85. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001 (2006).
86. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 82, at 147.
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Despite the fact that the realization rule arguably results in an unjust
distribution of the tax burden, the federal government maintains it,
even for assets—such as publicly traded securities—that can be easily
and accurately valued and against which taxpayers could readily
87
secure loans to provide the cash needed to pay any taxes due. By
adopting the federal tax base, the states adopt the same decision.
Other classic base-defining conundrums (and how Congress resolves
88
them) include whether to tax windfalls (yes), how often to tax
89
(annually), whether to allow income averaging to mitigate income
90
91
volatility (no), whether to adjust tax basis for inflation (no), and
many more.
Decisions about the so-called taxable unit warrant lengthier
treatment. The federal tax system permits four filing statuses: single,
head-of-household,
married-filing-jointly,
and
married-filingseparately. A large body of scholarship discusses the impact of this
92
seemingly innocuous set of filing statuses. In progressive tax systems,
joint filing provides a tax “bonus” to married couples who earn
income unevenly, because, by averaging their incomes, it allows such
spouses to lower their joint tax burden compared to if they were
single. However, married couples that earn income equally may pay a
“marriage penalty”; they pay more tax as a married couple than the

87. See, e.g., David A Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95
(1999) (exploring mark-to-market taxation for assets that are liquid and easy to value).
Experiences of other countries that maintain wealth taxes or imputed income taxes demonstrate
that the administrative difficulties posed by the need for annual valuation of at least some kinds
of assets are not insurmountable. See generally Moris Lehner, The European Experience with a
Wealth Tax: A Comparative Discussion, 53 TAX L. REV. 615 (2000) (detailing the wealth taxes
and imputed income taxes of eleven European countries).
88. See I.R.C. § 61 (2006); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955)
(holding that I.R.C. § 61 (1954) taxes windfalls).
89. I.R.C. § 441 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
90. See id. §§ 441–483 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (permitting only cash basis and accrual
accounting, and requiring annual reporting); see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against
Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1155–56 (2006) (“[P]eople who temporarily earn
very high incomes due to short-term success pay annual taxes at the same rates as do people
whose high incomes are a permanent part of their lives.”).
91. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 82, at 363–65.
92. See generally, e.g., Lily Kahng, One Is the Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a
Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651 (2010); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Theory Versus
Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV.
1413 (1996); Shari Motro, A New “I Do”: Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1509 (2006); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339
(1994).
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sum of the taxes they would pay if they were single. Commentators
observe that, by providing tax bonuses to couples that earn income
unevenly, the federal tax system favors traditional single-earner
94
households. In contrast with the filing status choices made by the
federal government, many other countries either reject joint filing or
95
provide married couples the option to file jointly or individually.
When states conform to federal filing statuses, they thereby import
into their own law the biases inherent in those statuses.
These examples show that, even before considering whether to
use taxes expressly to regulate, governments face a series of difficult
base-defining and structural decisions. How governments resolve
these issues influences taxpayer behavior and affects the distribution
of the tax burden across members of society. When states adopt
without deviation the federal tax base and filing rules, they import
federal decisions on these matters into their own tax systems.
2. Incentives. When the states incorporate the federal tax base,
they not only cede income-defining and structural tax authority, they
also cede regulatory authority in a more traditional sense, given that
the federal government uses tax incentives to regulate taxpayer
behavior. Although the primary function of the federal tax base is to
measure taxpayers’ net income in order to apply progressive tax rates
fairly, that is not its only function. The tax law contains many
provisions designed to serve policy goals or voter preferences, rather
96
than (or in addition to) defining income. When such provisions take
the form of tax subsidies—such as tax deductions, exemptions, and
credits—tax experts call them “tax expenditures” to highlight the

93. This result would occur if, for example, the progressive tax brackets that apply to
married couples are less than twice as large as those that apply to single taxpayers. See, e.g.,
Kahng, supra note 92, at 656–59 (defining and discussing marriage penalties).
94. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 92, at 371 (“The current joint-return system is not neutral.
It favors the traditional family both in the behavioral sense that it discourages women from
working, and in the distributive sense that it ignores the fact that a one-earner couple is really
better off than a two-earner couple with the same taxable income.”).
95. See Kornhauser, supra note 92, at 1437 n.56 (noting that most Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development countries tax spouses separately).
96. Whether a tax deduction is needed to measure net income properly depends on
whether the activity that generates the deduction is related to the production of taxable income.
For example, business expenses (such as inventory costs) are expenses related to producing
taxable income and therefore must be deducted in order to properly calculate net income. But
the home mortgage-interest deduction is not necessary for measuring net taxable income
because the United States does not tax the imputed rental income associated with a personal
residence. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
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97

revenue losses they generate. In contrast, when such provisions take
the form of new or increased taxes, acceleration of tax liabilities, or
denials of exemptions, deductions or tax credits, they have been
called “tax penalties” to highlight their purpose to discourage
98
particular taxpayer behavior.
By importing federal definitions of income, states thereby also
import any federal tax incentives embedded in those definitions. As a
result, states subsidize activities Congress has chosen to subsidize, and
they penalize activities Congress has chosen to penalize. Among the
many activities subsidized by federal tax incentives are home
99
100
101
ownership, employer provision of health insurance, charity,
102
103
savings, and family planning. Congress also has used the federal
104
105
tax law to penalize gambling, failure to save, failure to buy private
106
107
health insurance, and participation in the illegal drug trade. The
federal tax law also denies business deductions for certain disfavored
108
activities, such as the payment of antitrust treble damages, fines and
109
110
penalties, bribes and kickbacks, and certain kinds of disfavored
111
employee compensation. A state that fully conformed its own tax

97. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 35–37.
98. E.g., Mason, supra note 2, at 978; Eric Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 343–44 (1989).
99. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (2006) (allowing deductions for home mortgage interest).
100. See id. § 106 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (excluding employer-paid health-insurance
premiums from gross income).
101. See id. § 170 (allowing charitable-contribution deductions).
102. See, e.g., id. § 219 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (allowing deductions for contributions to
retirement savings accounts).
103. See id. § 213 (2006) (allowing deductions for qualified medical expenses); INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. 502, MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES 5–6, 13–14 (2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf (explaining that deductions include expenses for birthcontrol pills, sterilization, vasectomies, abortions, and fertility treatments).
104. See I.R.C. § 165(d) (denying losses from wagering to the extent that they exceed the
taxpayer’s gains from wagering).
105. Congress provides both tax subsidies to encourage savings and tax penalties to
discourage withdrawal of funds from tax-advantaged savings accounts. See, e.g., id.
§ 72(m)(5)(B), (q), (t), (v) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (taxing early withdrawals from retirement
plans and IRAs).
106. See id. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2011) (making the tax effective in 2014).
107. See id. § 280E (2006) (denying expenses related to illegal drug-trade profits).
108. Id. § 162(g) (2006).
109. Id. § 162(f).
110. Id. § 162(c).
111. See, e.g., id. § 162(m) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (limiting public companies’ deductions to
$1 million for non-performance-based compensation paid to certain key employees); id. § 280G
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base to the federal tax base likewise would incentivize and penalize
these same activities. Already a signficant mode of federal regulation,
112
federal tax incentives are on the rise, and as federal use of tax
incentives increases, so does state importation of federal policy
preferences through tax-base conformity.
3. Agenda-Setting and Other Authority. Although as a formal
matter states incorporating the federal tax base retain control over
their income tax policy agendas, as a practical matter tax-base
conformity results in the transfer of agenda-setting power from the
states to the federal government. For states with dynamic
incorporation of federal law, federal tax changes automatically take
effect at the state level unless the state legislature acts to decouple
from federal law. Likewise, states with static incorporation must pay
careful attention to federal tax changes in order to minimize
divergence between the state tax base and the federal tax base
because divergence erodes the advantages of conformity. In either
case, the states cede to the federal government significant influence
over state income tax agendas.
States adopting the federal tax base also cede nonlegislative
authority. For example, they cede regulatory and enforcement
authority to the Treasury Department by accepting Treasury’s tax
regulations as authoritative and by relying on IRS auditing and
enforcement. They also cede judicial authority when they accept the
outcome of federal tax adjudications as determinative of state income
113
tax liability.
B. Harmonization Costs
The Framers of the U.S. Constitution created a government
structure that ensured competition among governments: state
governments would compete with one another, and the federal
government would compete with those of the states. Through
competition and diffusion of power, federalism would preserve
individual liberty, discipline government, and make government

(2006 & Supp. V 2012) (disallowing employer deduction for certain golden-parachute
payments).
112. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 25–28 (providing statistics
on federal tax incentives).
113. See supra note 54.
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Because tax-base
representatives more responsive to voters.
conformity concentrates at the federal level what would otherwise be
tax power “diffused” across the fifty states, it undermines one of the
115
bulwarks against oppression inherent in our federal system. The
broad array of subject matters the federal government can and does
reach with its taxing power makes federal-state tax-base conformity
especially problematic. By conforming to the federal tax law, states
mirror federal regulatory choices, even in areas, such as the family,
116
that traditionally have been the province of the states.
Moreover, by providing one-stop shopping for federal and state
tax benefits, tax-base conformity also may facilitate lobbying and
rent-seeking. Narrow and well-organized political interests may use
lobbying at the federal level to secure benefits at both the federal and
117
state levels. Nor does base conformity necessarily reduce rentseeking at the state level; interest groups unable to secure favorable
federal tax legislation may take a second bite at the apple at the state
level.
This Section explores how tax-base conformity impacts
federalism values. It considers how the harmonization that results
from states’ incorporation of the federal tax base reduces policy
diversity and may raise political accountability concerns. Tax-base
conformity also undermines conforming states’ ability to tailor tax
118
incentives to local conditions, and it limits policy experimentation.

114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(describing federalism as creating a “double security” of the “rights of the people” because the
“different governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by
itself”); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism “makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry”).
115. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (noting that federalism secures
liberty through the “diffusion of sovereign power” (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted)). The Supreme
Court invoked the liberty-securing function of federalism when it stated that “[p]erhaps the
principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government power” and that “a
healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front.” Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
116. For examples of regulatory federal tax provisions, see supra Part III.A.1.
117. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the
Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 55–57,
71–125 (1990) (analyzing tax legislation under various theories, including public choice).
118. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (recounting federalism values, including “sensitiv[ity] to
the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society” and “innovation and experimentation in
government”); see also McConnell, supra note 70, at 1493–1500 (discussing advantages of
federalism, including “that local laws can be adapted to local conditions and local tastes” and
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1. Voter Preferences. As an initial matter, we might conclude
that state delegation of taxing authority to Congress poses no
democratic problem because state residents also have representation
119
in the federal government. Some might even argue that upward
delegations from the states to the federal government are democracyenhancing, because people pay more attention to federal politics than
to state politics, and because state elections have lower participation
120
levels than do national elections. Even if we did not conclude that
delegating up by the states was democracy-enhancing, most would
agree with Professor Dorf’s conclusion that such delegations sharply
contrast with national delegations of authority to supranational
121
bodies, such as the United Nations. After all, with federal-state taxbase conformity, the “delegate” is Congress, a relatively transparent,
well-monitored, democratically elected body. Indeed, in cases in
which state and federal voters agree on substantive policy, state
incorporation of federal law is unproblematic. For example, state and
federal voters are likely to agree that business expenses should be
deductible from gross income. As a result, state incorporation of
§ 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows taxpayers to deduct
122
“ordinary and necessary” business expenses, is unlikely to generate
controversy.
But federal-state tax-base conformity raises democratic concerns
when the preferences of state voters differ from those of national
voters. In a case interpreting Minnesota’s nondelegation principle to
permit only static, rather than dynamic, incorporation into state law
of the federal definition of adjusted gross income, the Minnesota
Supreme Court highlighted the problem when it observed that

“that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity and incentive to pioneer
useful changes”).
119. Cf. Dorf, supra note 3, at 108–10, 135–36, 153–58 (comparing tax-base conformity with
international delegation and considering whether representation within decisionmaking
structures might ameliorate democratic losses).
120. Cf. Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in
Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1326 (1994) (“For much of this century, the
states were generally considered to be the least representative . . . and the least accountable of
our three levels of government.”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 915 (1994) (“[T]he story of participation in state
and local government regularly features low voter turnouts, entrenched elites, and narrowminded policies.”); id. at 909, 936–51 (arguing that in the United States, “our real community is
a national one”).
121. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 112–13.
122. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006).
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[t]he amounts which are to be included or excluded in the
determination of [federal] adjusted gross income are numerous and
are subject to change. Many of the exclusions are based on political
and social rather than economic considerations. The same political
and social considerations which are of significance to the Federal tax
policy are not necessarily of significance to the state’s tax collection
scheme. . . . Any and all of these provisions, as well as others, may
be changed at any time by the Congress of the United States—
123
without consulting the Minnesota Legislature.

Because Congress uses the tax law to pursue a large number of
diverse regulatory programs, national and state preferences are likely
to diverge in at least some cases. Two politically charged examples
will demonstrate the point that by incorporating the federal tax base,
states may end up substituting national preferences for state
preferences.
The first example involves same-sex marriage. Several states
recognize same-sex marriage, but the federal Defense of Marriage
124
Act (DOMA) provides that federal tax provisions that rely on a
125
spousal relationship will not apply to same-sex married couples.
Whether DOMA increases or decreases the federal tax liability of
same-sex married couples compared to similarly situated opposite-sex
married couples depends on several factors, including whether the
126
same-sex spouses earn their income equally or unequally. In some
cases, the effect of DOMA is to increase same-sex couples’ tax
127
liability compared to similarly situated opposite-sex couples. For
123. Wallace v. Comm’r of Taxation, 184 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Minn. 1971).
124. Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
125. DOMA provides that:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
1 U.S.C. § 7. As a result, any federal tax benefits that depend on taxpayers’ married status
exclude same-sex married couples.
126. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
127. See Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
481, 498–99 (2009) (citing 2004 Congressional Budget Office estimates that repealing DOMA
would increase federal tax collections because of imposition on same-sex couples of the
“marriage tax penalty” and the disallowance of the option for members of same-sex married
couples to elect “Head of Household” filing status). For a discussion of states’ incorporation of
federal filing statuses, see generally Heather Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections and FederalState Conformity, 32 VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171339.
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example, DOMA prevents same-sex couples from claiming marriagerelated tax benefits, such as joint filing and the exclusion of fringe
128
benefits provided by an employer to the employee’s spouse. In
other cases, DOMA reduces same-sex couples’ tax liability compared
to similarly situated opposite-sex couples. For example, because
same-sex married couples are not considered spouses for purposes of
129
they have greater tax planning
federal tax anti-abuse rules,
130
opportunities.
States that incorporate without deviation federal tax filing
statuses or the federal definitions of adjusted gross income or taxable
income thereby import into their own tax systems differences in the
treatment of same- and opposite-sex married couples. In states
recognizing same-sex marriage, this incorporation may raise state
131
constitutional questions, and it also substitutes national for state
preferences regarding marriage equality. Such substitution would be
especially troubling from a democratic perspective in states where
recognition of same-sex marriage was prompted by popular
132
referendum. Whereas states that recognize same-sex marriage have
128. For a brief summary of federal tax disadvantages to same-sex married couples under
DOMA, see Cain, supra note 127, at 501–03, which provides a nonexhaustive list of such
disadvantages, including the inability of one spouse to itemize deductions while the other takes
the standard deduction.
129. See 1 U.S.C. § 7. Federal anti-abuse rules include provisions of the federal tax law
designed to prevent related parties from securing tax benefits from transactions that lack
economic substance. For example, a person cannot recognize a loss for tax purposes on property
sold to his or her spouse. See I.R.C. § 1041 (2006) (treating as a nonrecognition event sales
between spouses). For a broad and illuminating set of examples, see Theodore P. Seto, The
Unintended Tax Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529, 1548–93 (2008).
130. See Seto, supra note 129, at 1539–45 (arguing that same-sex couples should trigger tax
anti-abuse rules that apply to related parties because if such rules do not apply, same-sex
couples will be able to avoid tax more easily than similarly situated opposite-sex couples). Taxplanning opportunities available more to same-sex than opposite-sex couples under DOMA
include income shifting, avoidance of marriage penalties, the ability to claim larger earned
income tax credits despite larger family incomes, avoiding taxation of Social Security benefits,
the ability for one spouse to claim the standard deduction while the other claims itemized
deductions, and so on. Id. at 1559–80; see also Cain, supra note 127, at 501–03 (noting that,
among other strategies, same-sex couples can more easily recognize capital losses while still
maintaining control of the loss property).
131. Cf., e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–07 (Iowa 2009) (holding that denying
same-sex couples marriage licenses violated their equal-protection rights under the Iowa
Constitution).
132. The law of New York, for example, provides that a “marriage that is otherwise valid
shall be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.”
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(1) (McKinney 2010 & Supp. 2012); see also Rebecca DiLeonardo,
Washington Governor Certifies Same-Sex Marriage Referendum, JURIST (Dec. 6, 2012, 12:46
PM),
http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/12/washington-governor-certifies-same-sex-marriage-
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deviated from some of the federal tax provisions that treat same-sex
married taxpayers as unmarried, Part V shows why conforming states
cannot—as a practical matter—eliminate all differences of tax
treatment under DOMA between same- and opposite-sex married
133
couples.
The second politically charged example involves the large set of
federal tax preferences claimable by taxpayers who are not U.S.
citizens. With very few exceptions, the same federal tax laws apply to
all individuals who are tax residents of the United States, regardless
134
of their citizenship or immigration status. Noncitizens qualify as
135
U.S. residents for tax purposes if they are green card holders or if
(to simplify greatly) they are physically present in the United States
136
for more than half the tax year. Although qualification as a U.S. tax
resident triggers disadvantageous worldwide income taxation, it also
brings advantages. All U.S. tax residents, including those who hold
neither citizenship nor green cards, may claim most federal tax
benefits, including charitable deductions, mortgage deductions, state
and local tax deductions, exemptions for employer-provided health
137
care, deductions for contributions to savings plans, and so on.

referendum.php (noting that same-sex marriage was approved by popular referendums in 2012
in Maine, Maryland, and Washington, and that same-sex legislation has passed in five other
states: Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont).
133. See infra notes 265–267 and accompanying text.
134. Sections 1 and 61 of the Internal Revenue Code assess taxes against all “individuals”
without exception. These provisions would seem to include citizens as well as all aliens, resident
and nonresident. Sections 2(d) and 871, however, provide for a special regime applicable to
“nonresident aliens.” Compare I.R.C. §§ 1(a)–(d), 61 (2006) (assessing taxes against all
“individuals”), with id. §§ 2(d), 871 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (providing special tax rules for
“nonresident alien[s]”).
135. Lawful permanent residents of the United States are commonly called green card
holders. See, e.g., Green Card (Permanent Residence), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last updated May 13, 2011).
136. See id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (defining tax resident to include “lawful permanent
resident[s] of the United States”); see also id. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii) (defining tax resident to
include aliens meeting a substantial physical presence test, regardless of their immigration
status). Anyone who is neither a U.S. resident as defined in § 7701(b)(1) nor a U.S. citizen is a
“nonresident alien.” id. § 7701(b)(1)(B). A separate tax regime denies nonresident aliens almost
all federal tax expenditures. See id. § 873 (denying nonresident aliens most personal
deductions).
137. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 519, U.S. TAX GUIDE FOR ALIENS 8, 28
(2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p519--2010.pdf. Congress has imposed
immigration-status restrictions on a few tax expenditures, including the earned income tax
credit. To claim a dependent child under the earned income tax credit, the taxpayer, her spouse,
and her qualifying child(ren) all must possess Social Security numbers (SSNs). I.R.C. § 32(m)
(2006). Since 1996, only citizens, green card holders, and other resident aliens authorized to
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Rather than constituting evidence of Congress’s special solicitude for
immigrants or its desire to make the United States an attractive labor
market for foreigners, the advantageous treatment of tax-resident
aliens may be simply an unintended artifact of the federal tax law’s
division of the world of taxpayers into only two categories: residents
and nonresidents. Whatever the reasons, the federal tax law generally
does not distinguish among U.S. citizens, green card holders, and
others who reside for long periods in the United States. Indeed, a
person may be a U.S. resident for tax purposes even if she was not
138
legally admitted to the United States. States that incorporate the
federal tax base will inadvertently channel similar tax benefits to
139
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants. Extension at the
state level of these federal tax preferences may undermine other state
140
policies that aim to discourage inward migration by non-citizens.
work in the United States are entitled to SSNs. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra, at 32. As a
result, aliens residing in the United States who are not authorized to work in the United States
and who did not obtain an SSN under more liberal regulations applicable before 1996 cannot
claim the earned income tax credit.
The child tax credit (CTC) also contains restrictions based on the citizenship status of
the children being claimed. U.S. resident taxpayers (citizen and noncitizen, documented and
undocumented) may claim the CTC for children who are U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, or aliens
resident (for tax purposes) in the United States. No one may claim the CTC for alien children
who reside outside the United States. See I.R.C. § 24(c)(2) (2006) (denying CTCs to those
whose dependents are not “resident[s] of the United States”); id. § 152(b)(3)(A) (defining
dependents); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 972, CHILD TAX CREDIT 2 (2013),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p972.pdf (defining “[a] qualifying child for purposes
of the child tax credit”).
This Article discusses only the eligibility of undocumented aliens who are U.S. tax
residents for federal tax benefits, and it makes no claim regarding such taxpayers’ actual use of
those benefits.
138. See I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(3) (determining the tax residence of aliens who are
not permanent residents by reference to the number of days physically present in the United
States, without respect to whether the aliens were admitted legally or not).
139. Cf. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT
AUTHORIZED IN THE UNITED STATES WERE PAID $4.2 BILLION IN REFUNDABLE CREDITS 4
(2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/201141061fr.pdf
(discussing refunds of the CTC paid in 2010 to taxpayers who filed their taxes with Individual
Taxpayer Identification Numbers, rather than SSNs); id. at 6 (noting that the refundable CTC
“appears to provide an additional incentive for aliens to enter, reside, and work in the United
States without authorization”).
140. For example, Arizona’s controversial Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act requires state police to verify the immigration status of anyone they stop or
arrest, and the Act makes it a crime for immigrants to seek or obtain work without
authorization or to fail to carry federal immigration documents. See Support Our Law
Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 313, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, invalidated in
part by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511 (2012); see also NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, MORE HARM THAN GOOD: RESPONDING TO STATES’ MISGUIDED EFFORTS TO
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I have used charged political issues to highlight the regulatory
impact of federal-state tax-base conformity, but tax-base conformity
does not represent a commitment to adopt any particular political
viewpoint (for example, anti-marriage-equality or pro-immigration).
Rather, under conformity, states adopt the same tax policies as
Congress, no matter what the content of those policies. Although all
states deviate at least somewhat from the federal tax base, the
advantages of conformity appear to be compelling enough that the
overwhelming majority of states conform closely to the federal tax
base. The transfer of control over the content of tax policy from the
states to the federal government represents a democratic loss for state
residents. It results in the imposition on state residents of a tax regime
that diverges from the tax regime they would impose on themselves
through state-level democratic processes, at least under the
reasonable assumption that state preferences will sometimes differ
from national preferences.
2. Political Accountability.
A related criticism about the
democratic threat posed by federal-state tax-base conformity might
be that by causing confusion as to whether state or federal legislators
are responsible for state tax policies, conformity undermines the
ability of state voters to hold their representatives accountable for
unwanted tax policies. This argument can be drawn by analogy to
arguments made in the unfunded-mandates and conditional-grants
contexts. In holding that Congress could not simply commandeer the
states to implement federal goals, the Supreme Court in New York v.
141
United States warned that “where the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
142
ramifications of their decision.” Similarly, commentators have
reasoned that even though states have the opportunity to opt out of
conditional federal grants, such grants may cause confusion among

REGULATE
IMMIGRATION
11–13,
15–16
(2007),
available
at
http://nelp.3cdn.net/b5b735db8dc21687d0_llm6bx88t.pdf (reviewing proposed state legislation
designed to combat undocumented labor).
141. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (striking down the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, tit. I, 99 Stat. 1842
(1986), which required states to dispose of or take title of radioactive waste created in their
borders).
142. Id. at 169.
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voters as to whether to hold state or federal legislators (or both) to
143
account for the conditions attached to grants. The argument that
federal, rather than state, legislators should be held to account for
grant conditions seems to rest on the notion that although grants are
putatively conditional, states’ financial dependence on federal aid
144
makes states’ ability to refuse federal grants illusory. Thus, some
commentators see conditional grants as functionally equivalent to
mandates.
A similar argument could be made about tax-base conformity.
Specifically, because the administrative benefits of base conformity
are so significant—or, put negatively, because the costs associated
with fully autonomous operation of a state income tax are so high—
states that need to tax income lack a meaningful choice between
conformity and an autonomous tax base. In short, the argument
would run, states that seek to tax income must conform to the federal
tax base, and as a result, state lawmakers should not be held
politically accountable for the content of the tax base. Or, at a
minimum, conformity confuses voters as to which level of government
to hold responsible for the content of the state tax base. Although the
Supreme Court usually has rejected constitutional challenges to
145
conditional grants,
if conditional grants and base conformity
actually create voter confusion, that confusion would be undesirable
as a policy matter. Whether base conformity causes voter confusion
poses theoretical as well as empirical questions. First is the theoretical
question of which level (or levels) of government ought to be held
accountable for the substance of the state tax base, and second is the
empirical question of how voters actually assign political
accountability for the content of the state tax base.

143. Cf. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora’s Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 486 (2002) (describing a
political win-win for state and federal officials in which both are likely to welcome grants to
promote local benefits and improve their standing with the electorate).
144. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1911, 1933–39 (1995) (explaining different reasons why conditional grants rarely present a
real choice to states).
145. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166–77 (contrasting constitutionally permissible conditional
grants with unconstitutional commandeering). But see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 2566, 2603–07 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., Breyer & Kagan, J.J.) (holding unconstitutionally
coercive the discretion given under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to Secretary
of Health and Human Services to withhold all existing Medicaid funds from states that chose
not to participate in the act’s Medicaid expansion if those states did not comply with any
Medicaid requirement).
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3. Tailoring Tax Incentives. In addition to reducing states’
abilities to respond to voter preferences and potentially undermining
political accountability, tax-base conformity also reduces the ability of
states to tailor tax incentives to local conditions. Regional differences
in elasticities of supply and demand can result in the same tax
incentive having different effects in different states. Consider the
146
The
federal deduction for home mortgage-interest payments.
effectiveness of the subsidy in encouraging homeownership depends
in part on the elasticity of the supply of housing. If housing supply is
inelastic, such that no new houses will be built in response to the
subsidy, then over time the effect of the subsidy will be to increase
147
house prices. If the subsidy becomes fully capitalized into higher
148
house prices, it will no longer encourage taxpayers to buy homes.
Housing supply is more elastic in the Midwest than on the coasts,
149
because density is already high on the coasts. As a result, it could be
efficient to selectively subsidize homeownership in the Midwest, but
not on the coasts. Because federal taxes generally are nationally
uniform, however, it is difficult for Congress to take advantage of
such differences in regional elasticities. By incorporating one-size-fitsall federal tax incentives, states miss the opportunity to tailor their tax
incentives to local conditions.
Information asymmetry also can cause tax incentives to be
inefficient. For example, any time the government tries to encourage
an activity by subsidizing it, it risks wasting some of the subsidy on
people who would have engaged in the behavior even without the
subsidy. The government cannot set the subsidy efficiently because it
does not know how much subsidy each taxpayer requires to engage in
the desired behavior, and it is in the taxpayer’s interest to exaggerate
150
the amount she requires in the hopes of increasing the subsidy. If an
imaginary creature—call it Pigou’s Demon—could reveal each
taxpayer’s elasticity, the government could get subsidies exactly right.
But without Pigou’s Demon, preferences stay hidden and the
government cannot provide perfect subsidies. Such information
146. I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (2006).
147. William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1179 (2007).
148. For an explanation of capitalization using numerical examples, see Deborah M. Weiss,
Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1949, 1955–62 (1994).
149. Gale et al., supra note 147, at 1179.
150. Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973, 1009–10 (1986).
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asymmetries are thought to be smaller between taxpayers and states
than between taxpayers and the federal government because states
are closer to the people and presumably have better access than does
151
the federal government to information about them. If this is so, then
it would be more effective for states to use their superior information
to set their own tax incentives than for states simply to copy federal
152
incentives. Data maintained by the federal government show that
153
claims for federal tax incentives vary widely by state, reflecting
differences in the attributes of state residents and suggesting potential
efficiency gains from greater tailoring of tax incentives to state
attributes.
4. Policy Experimentation. Federal-state tax-base conformity
erodes another traditional benefit of federalism: that federalism
154
allows the states to conduct regulatory experiments. Even when
residents of all states agree on a particular policy goal, there may be
different ways of achieving it. Similarly, if a problem shared by all the
states has different causes in different locations, then the most
effective strategy for combating that problem will differ regionally.
For example, although residents of many states may share the goal of
reducing reliance on fossil fuels, each state’s tax incentives should
promote the use of alternative energy resources appropriate to that
state’s particular climate and energy consumption profile. By
adopting broadly targeted federal tax incentives for green

151. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (“Viewed as a whole, our
jurisprudence has recognized that the needs of society have varied between different parts of
the Nation, just as they have evolved over time in response to changed circumstances. Our
earliest cases in particular embodied a strong theme of federalism, emphasizing the ‘great
respect’ that we owe to state legislatures and state courts in discerning local public needs.”
(quoting Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908))); Wallace E. Oates, An
Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1120, 1121–22 (1999) (noting that fiscal
federalism combines the federal government’s financial power and stability with the states’
abilities to know what the public needs).
152. Because state tax rates are lower than federal tax rates, state tax subsidies that take the
form of deductions or exemptions have a smaller incentive effect than their federal equivalents.
Nevertheless, if states go to the trouble (and revenue expense) of providing tax subsidies at all,
they have an interest in ensuring that those subsidies are as efficient as possible.
153. See generally TAQUESHA CAIN, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS, BY STATE, 2007 (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/11inbystatesprbul.pdf (analyzing and reproducing data from the IRS’s Statistics of Income
Bulletin showing differences across states in taxpayers’ claims for tax expenditures).
154. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(reasoning that states may devise different ways to pursue similar policy goals, thus serving as
“laborator[ies]” for “social and economic experiments”).
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technologies through incorporating the federal tax base, however,
states miss the opportunity to incentivize technologies that are
particularly effective for their state. Many states have enacted their
own energy tax incentives in addition to those they incorporate from
155
the federal government. For example, Arizona subsidizes solar
156
157
energy, and Montana subsidizes geothermal energy. But to the
extent that states use these tailored credits in addition to, rather than
as a substitute for, federal one-size-fits-all solutions, they risk wasting
158
revenue on inefficient subsidies. Moreover, state-level tax policies
may conflict with federal tax policies imported into state law by
incorporation. For example, Georgia’s deviating tax incentive for lowand zero-emission vehicles coexists with its federally derived “SUV
loophole,” which allows expensing of a significant portion of the cost
159
of heavy, low-mileage vehicles used in a trade or business. Georgia
imported the federal SUV loophole by incorporating (without
160
deviation) the federal calculation of business income.

155. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that thirty-eight states provide energy or
environmental credits).
156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1085 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing a tax credit for
installing a solar energy device in a residence).
157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-32-115 (2012) (providing a tax credit for installation of a
geothermal heating or cooling system in a principal dwelling).
158. Generally, states enact their own green credits in addition to the green tax incentives
that they import from the federal tax base. Individuals can take advantages of federal energy
credits covering a wide variety of technologies, including biomass stoves, insulation, geothermal
pumps, wind turbines, solar and fuel cells, energy-efficient HVAC units and water heaters, and
energy-efficient cars, such as fuel cell, hybrid, and electric cars. See JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, TAX EXPENDITURES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION AND CONSERVATION 5–9 (2009)
(listing federal credits for energy efficiency available to individuals). But see Roberta F. Mann,
Federal, State, and Local Tax Policies for Climate Change: Coordination or Cross-Purpose?, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 369, 386–91 (2011) (arguing that the failure of federal and state
governments to coordinate their responses to climate change results in inefficiencies and
conflicts).
159. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-40.16 (2009) (providing Georgia taxpayers with tax
credits for zero- and low-emission vehicles), with I.R.C. § 179 (2006) (allowing immediate
expensing of up to $25,000 for the costs of SUVs weighing 14,000 pounds or less and not
covered by § 280F), and id. § 280F (restricting depreciation deductions for “luxury automobiles”
weighing 6,000 pounds or less). See generally Lawrence Zelenak, The Loophole That Would Not
Die: A Case Study in the Difficulty of Greening the Internal Revenue Code, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 469, 473–79 (2011) (giving the history of the federal SUV loophole). Professor Zelenak
remarks that “[a]lthough the SUV loophole is neither the most economically significant nor the
most environmentally damaging of the Internal Revenue Code’s offenses against the
environment, it is among the most transparent and the most outrageous.” Id.
160. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 22 (indicating that Georgia does not deviate from
the federal calculation of business, rent, or farming income); see also GA. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
FORM 500, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN 5 l. 3 (2010), available at https://etax.dor.ga.gov/
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C. Fiscal Stability
Another disadvantage of tax-base conformity is that it injects
uncertainty into state fiscal systems by increasing the volatility of
state tax revenues. This volatility makes it more difficult for states to
meet their financial obligations. One source of volatility is the income
tax itself—income taxes are more volatile than other kinds of taxes,
such as property or sales taxes. The second source of volatility stems
from changes in federal law.
Professor Kirk Stark has argued that the ability to conform with
the federal tax base, as well as the other administrative advantages of
conformity, make it easy for states to assess income taxes. Conformity
may even make it easier for states to use income taxes than to use
property or sales taxes. According to Professor Stark, the
“gravitational pull in favor of base conformity” results in states’
161
overreliance on the income tax base instead of other tax bases. The
problem with state overreliance on income taxation, in Professor
Stark’s view, is that compared to other kinds of taxes, income taxes
162
generate revenue volatility for states. Other tax bases, such as
property and sales, are more stable than the income tax because they
163
are not as closely tied to the business cycle.
Professor Stark acknowledges, however, that one virtue of state
reliance on income taxes is that income taxes automatically stabilize
the economy more than do taxes on other bases, such as property and
164
sales taxes. Income taxes function as automatic stabilizers because
when incomes rise, tax payments automatically increase, leaving
taxpayers with less to spend. On the other hand, when the economy
contracts and incomes fall, people owe less in taxes as a percentage of
their income, which dampens the effect of the loss of income on their

inctax/2011_forms/TSD_Individual_Income_Tax_Return_500-2011_Fillable.pdf (listing lowand zero-emission-vehicle tax credits).
161. Stark, supra note 1, at 432.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 422.
164. Id. at 417. For an empirical study on the extent to which federal taxes automatically
stabilize economic fluctuations, see generally Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The
Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer
2000, at 37.
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ability to consume. The more progressive the tax system is, the more
165
it automatically stabilizes the economy.
Although income taxes have salutary macroeconomic stabilizing
effects, federal-state tax-base conformity generates revenue volatility
unrelated to the business cycle. Specifically, conforming states
experience revenue volatility stemming from changes in federal tax
law. Such changes can dramatically increase or decrease state tax
revenues, and they do not necessarily serve macroeconomic
stabilizing goals. For example, in 1986 Congress substantially
broadened the tax base by eliminating many tax preferences. To
compensate for the broader base, the federal government also
increased exemptions and the standard deduction, and it lowered tax
166
rates. Incorporating states that did not amend their exemptions,
167
standard deductions, or rates experienced large revenue windfalls.
Although some states returned at least some of this windfall to their
168
residents, such unanticipated revenue windfalls are wasteful; they
169
tend to lead to greater government spending, which may be
unsustainable.
Although most states experienced revenue windfalls due to the
1986 tax reform, because its overall effect was to lower federal taxes,
states that assessed taxes as a percentage of residents’ federal tax
liability experienced significant revenue shortfalls to the extent that
170
they did not increase their rates. More generally, changes to the
federal tax law that narrow the tax base or provide new tax subsidies
165. Cf. Thomas J. Kniesner & James P. Ziliak, Tax Reform and Automatic Stabilization, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 590, 590 (2002) (finding that lowering tax rates as part of the 1986 tax reform
reduced the automatic stabilizing effect of the income tax).
166. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).
167. Id.; see also ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SR-8, THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986—ITS EFFECT ON BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE PERSONAL INCOME
TAX LIABILITIES 26 (1988) (estimating average percentage increases in state tax revenue due to
the federal tax changes to be 7.4 percent, ranging from 0.7 percent in New England to 18.9
percent in the Southwest); id. at 4, 26 (noting that the lowest income quintile of state taxpayers
faced the largest increases in their state tax liability).
168. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).
169. See generally Helen F. Ladd, State Responses to the TRA86 Revenue Windfalls: A New
Test of the Flypaper Effect, 12 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 82 (1993) (finding that states spent
the windfalls from the 1986 act).
170. See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1195 n.1 (noting that in 1986 Nebraska, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, and Vermont calculated their taxes as a percentage of federal tax); see also
ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 167, at 13 (estimating
revenue losses in those states respectively at 8.6 percent, 10.2 percent, 11.5 percent, and 9.9
percent). For a discussion of the state tax consequences of the recent repeal and reinstatement
of the federal estate tax, see infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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precipitate state revenue shortfalls. If states fail to either raise their
tax rates or decouple from revenue-reducing federal legislation, they
may have trouble meeting their spending obligations.
Making matters worse, Congress frequently amends federal tax
law late in the year, or at times when state legislatures are not in
171
session. Congress also often enacts tax legislation with retroactive
effect. Such revenue shocks are hard for conforming states to absorb
because, unlike the federal government, most states’ constitutions or
statutes limit their ability to issue debt and require them to balance
their budgets annually, which prevents them from relying on deficit
172
spending. Thus, revenue volatility is worse for the states than for the
federal government.
State revenue volatility from changes in federal law also may
combine with volatility from the business cycle. Congress may narrow
the federal tax base during a recession, relying on deficit spending to
meet its expenses and pay for public programs. For example, federal
bonus depreciation rules enacted as stimulus in 2002 resulted in
revenue shortfalls for states that did not decouple from the federal
173
rules. Although most states have rainy-day funds to help them
navigate economic downturns, these funds are often insufficient to
174
cover gaps. Because they cannot deficit spend, to maintain revenue
when the federal government narrows the tax base, incorporating
states must take the politically difficult step of increasing tax rates. If
a state is unable to raise taxes to maintain revenue, it must cut
spending. Empirical research shows that states exhibit “fiscal
175
perversity” in response to recessions. Specifically, states raise taxes
171. See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 15, at 980 (noting that the landmark Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.
(2006 & Supp. V 2012)), was made effective for the 1986 tax year, but was not enacted by
Congress “until late October of that year, by which time many state legislatures were no longer
in session”).
172. All states except Vermont and Wyoming have balanced-budget requirements, and in
addition, states have “the expectation and tradition of balanced budgets and the concern that
state bond ratings may be lowered if the state’s budget does not balance.” U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/AFMD-93-58BR, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE
EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3–4 (1993).
173. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 7.02[1][a] (Supp. 2007); see also I.R.C.
§ 168(k) (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (permitting 50 percent of the basis of qualified property to be
deducted in the first year).
174. Forty-five states have rainy-day funds. Michaele Morrow & Robert Ricketts, State
Conformity with Federal Tax Changes, 32 J. AM. TAX’N ASS’N, Fall 2010, at 27, 28 n.2.
175. See ALVIN H. HANSEN & HARVEY S. PERLOFF, STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE IN THE
NATIONAL ECONOMY 48 (1944) (coining the term “fiscal perversity”).
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and cut benefits in bad economic times, even though such procyclical
176
responses tend to deepen recessions. Welfare programs especially
177
suffer from states’ procyclical responses to recessions.
IV. TAX-BASE CONFORMITY AND STATE TAX COMPETITION
The impact of tax-base conformity on state tax competition
warrants separate analysis. From the perspective of state tax
competition, the most important effect of conformity is horizontal
harmonization. When the states incorporate by reference the federal
tax base, the states end up using the same tax base—or nearly the
same tax base—as each other. As a result, it is easier for mobile
residents to compare tax burdens across states than if each state used
a completely different base. Perfect base harmonization would allow
taxpayers to compare state tax burdens by simply comparing nominal
rates across states. At the other extreme, if every state constructed its
tax base from scratch, comparing nominal state tax rates would tell
residents nothing about effective tax burdens. Instead, to understand
effective tax burdens, taxpayers would have to invest in learning
about and comparing state tax bases. Whether facilitating the
comparison of state tax burdens is salutary depends on whether state
178
tax competition is productive or destructive.
Commentators have argued that tax competition promotes
welfare by constraining self-interested politicians who, without regard
to voter preferences, seek to maximize tax revenue and the size of the
179
public sector. Under this view, residents “tame Leviathan” by
176. See Super, supra note 16, at 2559.
177. See id. at 2613–14 (explaining that during the recessions in 1990–1991 and 2001, state
spending cuts fell heavily on programs providing cash assistance to the poor).
178. Compare Enrich, supra note 75, at 380–405 (arguing that state competition to provide
business tax incentives creates a lamentable race to the bottom), with Clayton P. Gillette,
Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447,
453–57 (1997) (arguing that the salutary effects of state business tax competition have been
undervalued).
179. See GEOFFREY BRENNAN & JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX:
ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION 186 (1980) (arguing that despite the
spillovers between different units in a federal system, tax competition is “an objective to be
sought in its own right” because of its constraining effect on tax rates and revenue-seeking
politicians). Professor Wallace Oates’s review of empirical research on decentralization and the
size of the public sector led him to conclude that the evidence was mixed, but that the strongest
support for the Leviathan theory could be found on a local level, rather than the state or
national level. He attributed this outcome to the lower costs of movement between localities
than between states or nations. See generally Wallace E. Oates, Searching for Leviathan: A
Reply and Some Further Reflections, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 578 (1989). For an analysis of yardstick
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exiting—or threatening to exit—the jurisdiction or by politically
punishing lawmakers for imposing higher taxes than those applicable
in neighboring states. Proponents of the Leviathan view would regard
tax-base conformity as salutary because, by making it easier for
taxpayers to compare tax burdens across states, conformity facilitates
tax competition, thereby disciplining state taxing and spending.
On the other hand, if, instead of disciplining government
officials, state tax competition sparks a destructive race to the bottom
in which states compete for residents by lowering tax burdens until
states cannot adequately fund public goods, then tax-base conformity
is undesirable precisely because it facilitates easy comparison of
competing tax rates. Using theoretical models, economists have
shown that tax competition between the states may result in
inefficiently low tax rates and, consequently, public sectors that are
180
181
too small. Empirical evidence provides some support for this view.
By obscuring effective tax burdens and thereby dampening
competition, nonconformity therefore could shore up state tax
revenues.
Notice, however, that regardless of whether the dominant effect
of state tax base competition is to “tame Leviathan” or “beggar thy
neighbor,” federal-state tax-base conformity does not prevent robust
tax competition. First, as long as conformity is only partial, states can
compete with respect to deviations from the federal tax base.
Additionally, even if all states have identical tax bases, they can still
compete by offering different tax rates and menus of public goods. As
long as states can distinguish themselves from each other via tax rates
and public benefits, state competition can occur. Of course, uniform
state tax bases would enhance tax competition by making it easier for
mobile residents to compare state tax burdens. Even in the absence of
perfect base conformity, however, empirical evidence shows that
taxpayers discern and respond to differences in overall tax burdens

competition, see generally Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking,
Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995).
180. John D. Wilson & David E. Wildasin, Capital Tax Competition: Bane or Boon, 88 J.
PUB. ECON. 1065, 1065 (2004).
181. See id. at 1069–72 (discussing several models developed to measure the effect of tax
competition on the size of local governments). But see Wallace E. Oates, Fiscal Competition and
the European Union: Contrasting Perspectives, 31 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 133, 137 (2001)
(surveying available empirical evidence and concluding that it shows that tax competition results
in suboptimal tax levels, but not a “race to bottom” or a “downward spiral in public sector
activities”).
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across states. Because tax burden competition can take place in the
absence or presence of federal-state tax-base conformity, knowing
whether such competition is destructive or salutary does not provide a
complete answer to the question of whether states should conform to
the federal tax base.
Nevertheless, conformity generates certain advantages that do
not depend on answering the larger question about whether state tax
competition is net beneficial or destructive. First, conformity aids
Tieboutian sorting at the state level. Using what he characterized as
183
an “extreme”
theoretical model that included unrealistic
184
assumptions, economist Charles Tiebout showed that competition
among localities for mobile residents would lead to efficient provision
of local public goods because it would reveal taxpayers’ hidden
preferences for public goods and levels of taxation. In Tiebout’s
model, taxpayers would reveal these hidden preferences by “voting
185
with their feet.”
Although Tiebout’s work involved local
governments, rather than states, scholars have applied the same logic
186
to mobility among states. To the extent that conformity aids in
revealing taxpayers’ hidden preferences—thereby making the
provision of public goods more efficient—it is beneficial.
Another potential benefit of conformity involves the tax
187
incentives states offer to attract mobile businesses. States compete

182. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr., Altered States: Taxes and the Location of Foreign Direct
Investment in America, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1076, 1080–92 (1996) (finding that corporations
from countries that exempt foreign-source income are more likely to invest in low-tax U.S.
states than high-tax U.S. states).
183. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 419–
20 (1956).
184. Among the other assumptions in Tiebout’s model were that human mobility was
costless and motivated only by taxes and the availability of locally provided public goods, that
people’s preferences for taxes and public goods were fixed, that taxpayers had accurate
information about the tax and benefit profiles of all the jurisdictions, that all the costs of local
public goods would be borne exclusively by residents (no tax exportation), and that all benefits
of local expenditures would accrue only to residents (no spillovers). See id. at 419.
185. See id. at 420.
186. See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Fiscal Federalism in Europe: Lessons
from the United States Experience, 36 EUR. ECON. REV. 654, 656 (1992) (arguing that centralized
fiscal policies may counteract “free mobility of labor across the members of an economic
union”); cf. Wilson & Wildasin, supra note 180 (reviewing the literature on interjurisdictional
capital tax competition).
187. In some cases, business tax incentives are designed to aid in-state business, and are not
specifically designed to affect locational decisions. In other cases, state tax incentives are
designed to poach business from neighboring states. See Louise Story, As Companies Seek Tax
Deals, Governments Pay High Price, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2012, at A1 (noting that “corporations
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to attract mobile businesses not only by lowering their tax rates, but
also by offering tax incentives. Although many have argued that tax
burden competition has the beneficial effect of disciplining
lawmakers, business-tax incentive competition has been harshly
criticized as a zero-sum game among the states that erodes state tax
188
revenues without increasing national welfare. To be effective at
luring business from other states, such incentives must offer benefits
that cannot be secured elsewhere. Thus, they take the form of
deviations from the federal tax base. Examples of business-tax
deviations include tax credits for new equipment put into service
189
within the state. Because state business-tax incentives represent
deviations from the federal tax base, they require special reporting on
state tax forms. As a result, they are more salient to taxpayers, voters,
and lawmakers than would be business-tax incentives that were part
of an autonomous state tax base. Deviating state business-tax
incentives require special reporting on state tax forms. This increased
salience could help the incentives be more effective as incentives.
Additionally, it could make such incentives more politically
accountable, which would be especially important if state business-tax
incentives represent a destructive race to the bottom among states.
V. DECOUPLING STATE AND FEDERAL TAX BASES
Although the disadvantages of tax-base conformity are
significant, the fact that all states with income taxes significantly
conform their tax bases to the federal base suggests that the
advantages of conformity outweigh the disadvantages. Nevertheless,
states have been reluctant to maintain strict conformity with the
federal tax base. For example, in 1972, to ease state administrative
costs associated with state income taxation, Congress passed the
have. . . creat[ed] a high-stakes bazaar where they pit local officials against one another to get
the most lucrative package”).
188. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 75, at 390–97 (summarizing empirical evidence on the
effectiveness of state tax incentives and finding that the evidence is inconclusive as to whether
such incentives affect location of business, though they clearly undermine state finances); cf.
Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local Economic Development, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 332 (2010) (“[T]here is some evidence that subsidies do not ultimately alter
the location decisions of firms. And even if location subsidies do enhance local welfare, they do
not improve overall welfare—one city loses what another city gains.” (footnote omitted)). State
and local business tax incentives do not have a more a significant impact on locational decisions
because the value of those incentives is small compared to other factors, such as labor, supply,
and transportation costs. Enrich, supra note 75, at 391.
189. See Enrich, supra note 75, at 382–89 (describing state business tax incentives).
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Federal-State Tax Collection Act, which provided states the ability
to opt into a program under which the federal government would
collect state income taxes and remit those taxes to the states. The act
191
required nearly complete state conformity with the federal tax base.
As a result, the only significant income tax policy choice that would
remain with states opting into the program was how high to set their
192
tax rates. Even though the states already substantially conformed
their tax bases with that of the federal government, no state opted
into the collection system, despite the significant administrative
193
194
savings at stake. The act was repealed in 1990. Commentators
offered a variety of observations to explain the utter failure of the
195
legislation, but one clear drawback was the act’s requirement of
196
complete conformity with the federal tax base.
This Part argues that the ability of the states to decouple their
tax regimes from particular federal tax provisions crucially safeguards
state tax autonomy and significantly mitigates the other disadvantages
of tax-base conformity identified in Part III, while at the same time
allowing states to secure most of the administrative benefits of
conformity.
Although the ability to decouple from the federal tax law
preserves state tax autonomy, this Part explains that incorporating
states do not have complete flexibility to deviate from the federal tax
law. First, the costs of deviation—including administrative and
political costs—limit the extent to which the states can deviate from
federal law. In addition, as a practical matter, certain federal tax rules
are not subject to deviation. For example, although it may be
190. Federal-State Tax Collection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-512, tit. II, 86 Stat. 936 (1972),
repealed by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI,
§ 11801(a)(45), 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). For a discussion of the history, advantages, and
disadvantages of the act, see generally Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1.
191. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 75–92 (describing conformity requirements and
limited exceptions).
192. See id. at 77.
193. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02[2] (Supp. 2003).
194. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XI, subtit. H, pt.
I, subpt. A, § 11801(a)(45), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388–522 (1990); see also HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 (Supp. 2003).
195. The law required states to allow the IRS to represent them in all tax enforcement
disputes, civil and criminal, so another concern among states was that the federal government
would be insufficiently zealous in pursuing state revenue claims. Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at
89.
196. Id. at 113–25 (discussing loss of state autonomy as an “oft-stated objection to the
federal collection system”).
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practical for states to deviate from the federal home mortgage
deduction, it is not practical to deviate from the federal realization
rule, because the realization rule cannot easily be severed from the
rest of the federal tax base. Because whether a federal rule is
severable is determined by its degree of entrenchment in federal law,
rather than by normative criteria, it is reasonable to conclude that at
least some nonseverable federal tax rules are undesirable from the
perspective of state taxation. As a result, conforming states
incorporate at least some federal tax policies that do not work well
for them and that state voters would not choose for themselves. Thus,
although the ability of states to decouple from federal tax provisions
constitutes a powerful federalism safeguard, it does not fully mitigate
the disadvantages of conformity.
A. Full and Partial Decoupling
No law requires states to conform to the federal tax base. Nor
must a state that rejects conformity necessarily take on the legislative
and administrative burden of autonomously enacting and maintaining
an income tax. Instead, states can raise tax revenue from other
197
sources, such as property and sales taxes. That nine states have no
comprehensive personal income tax shows that it is possible for at
198
least some states to function without significant income taxation.
Over time, however, states’ reliance on income taxation has grown as
a percentage of overall state and local tax receipts, which suggests
that states will find it increasingly difficult to raise all the revenue
199
they need from other tax bases.
In addition to the nine states without comprehensive income
taxes, another six states assess comprehensive income taxes but do
not use federal AGI or federal taxable income as their starting point
200
for calculating income. As discussed earlier, however, these facially
197. Exclusive of local taxation, in fiscal year 2008, states raised 28 percent of their revenue
from income taxes, including both individual and corporate taxes. See TAX POLICY CTR., supra
note 12, at 3. Income taxes do not represent a significant source of revenue for most localities.
See JEFFREY L. BARNETT & PHILLIP M. VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2010, at 6 tbl.A-1 (2012), available at
http://www2.census.gov/govs/estimate/summary_report.pdf (displaying data showing that the
substantial majority of local revenue derives from entities such as higher education institutions
and hospitals, property taxes, and sales and gross receipts taxes).
198. See supra note 18.
199. See supra note 6.
200. The six states are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania. OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14, 16, 27, 36, 41, 49.
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nonconforming states substantially conform to the federal tax base.
The use by even facially nonconforming states of federal income tax
concepts reflects the prohibitive costs of devising a fully autonomous
202
income tax base. This should not be surprising when we consider
that the federal Internal Revenue Code is two thick volumes
203
containing over 3.7 million words, and the Treasury regulations that
interpret them fill an additional six volumes.
States that judge it infeasible to decouple fully from the federal
tax base nevertheless can—and do—deviate from particular
204
provisions of the federal tax law. States can accomplish this
deviation at any time by a simple act of the state legislature.
Deviations take a variety of forms. “Additions,” or “add-backs,”
enlarge the state tax base compared to the federal tax base because
they require that the taxpayer add back an item of income that she
excluded or deducted at the federal level. If the addition is an item
separately stated on the federal tax form, such as the deduction for
IRA contributions or the deduction for student-loan interest
205
payments, then the state deviation will not significantly increase
206
taxpayer compliance burdens. In contrast, when states add back
207
items that are not separately stated on federal forms, compliance
and enforcement costs increase. Deviations also may reduce statetaxable income as compared to federally taxable income. Like
additions, such “subtractions” can be items separately stated on

201. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text; see also HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 8, ¶ 7.02[3] (Supp. 2007) (explaining that such states also “largely follow the federal
provisions” for corporate taxation).
202. Such costs include the expectations by state taxpayers that the state income tax base
will (substantially) match the federal base.
203. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 n.6 (2008), available
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_exec_summ0108v2.pdf.
204. See, e.g., Mark A. Muntean, California’s Nonconforming Conformity Legislation, 39 ST.
TAX NOTES 259, 259 (2006) (noting that California’s tax law “includes nearly 50 pages of
nonconforming provisions in the form of exceptions to the IRC”).
205. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 1040, at 1 l. 32 (2012), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040.pdf (providing for IRA contribution deduction); id. at 1
l. 33 (providing for student-loan interest deduction).
206. Cf. Pomp, supra note 48, at 1201 (labeling the state practice of requiring the same
information as federal tax returns as “facial/recordkeeping conformity”); id. at 1205 (arguing
that “provisions that violate facial/recordkeeping conformity should be suspect . . . and can be
justified only if their resulting benefits are clear and substantial”).
207. For example, although interest on state and local bonds is federally exempt, most states
require residents to add back interest earned on out-of-state bonds, a figure that appears
nowhere on the federal tax form. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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209

federal forms, or not. Tax credits provide another mechanism for
deviation. Although many states conform at least partially with
210
federal tax credits, most states offer tax credits of their own
211
design.
B. Mitigating Role of Decoupling
212

A few state tax deviations are constitutionally required, but
most deviations reflect state preferences and policy goals. The ability
of states to deviate from individual provisions of the federal tax law
distinguishes federal-state tax-base conformity from other
intergovernmental cooperative mechanisms that raise more serious
democratic accountability concerns, such as conditional grants or
213
delegations of authority to supranational organizations. As this
Section explains, deviations represent an important safeguard that

208. For example, many states allow residents to subtract pensions from their state-taxable
incomes. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 5. Such pensions are federally taxable and
separately stated on Form 1040, page 1, line 16. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205,
at l l. 16.
209. For example, some states offer tax preferences for qualified college-savings programs
other than (or in addition to) federal I.R.C. § 529 college-savings plans. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/203(a)(2)(D-20) (West 2012) (excluding distributions from the Illinois Prepaid
Tuition Trust Fund, while requiring taxpayers to add back into income the return on federal §
529 plans); N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(c)(32) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2013) (providing exclusion
under New York tax law of distributions from qualified New York college-savings plans).
Because these amounts are not federally deductible (or excludable), they involve separate
record-keeping obligations for state taxpayers.
210. When states conform to a federal tax credit, they typically do so by offering state
taxpayers a percentage of the federal credit. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(h)
(LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012) (providing against Massachusetts tax due a credit of 15 percent
of the taxpayer’s federally calculated earned income tax credit).
211. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 6 (noting that the most common state tax credits
include credits for taxes paid to other states, energy and environmental credits, jobs and
business credits, child- and dependent-care credits, low-income credits, elderly and disabled
credits, earned income tax credits, and credits for property taxes, rent payments or homesteads).
212. For example, states cannot tax federal obligations without congressional permission.
See Pomp, supra note 48, at 1207 n.24. Likewise, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
dormant foreign Commerce Clause to prevent states from using their tax systems to
discriminate against foreign commerce, even if the discriminatory provision was incorporated
from federal law. See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 74,
82 (1992) (holding that Iowa’s method of calculating corporate dividends-received-deductions
(DRDs) violated the dormant Commerce Clause because, like the federal DRD, it denied the
deduction to dividends received from non-U.S. corporations).
213. See Dorf, supra note 3, at 123 (concluding that some delegations to supranational
organizations are de facto irrevocable because “the only way to opt out of one of [the
supranational body’s] enactments is to opt out of the entire apparatus, with potentially
disastrous economic and diplomatic consequences”).
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mitigates some of the disadvantages of conformity raised in Part III.
Specifically, the ability of states to deviate from federal tax provisions
helps preserve state autonomy and regulatory diversity, may improve
political accountability, allows states to tailor tax incentives to local
conditions, and provides states a method to reduce the revenue
volatility associated with conforming to the ever-changing federal tax
base. Although deviations from the federal tax base (or from federal
filing statuses) increase state taxpayers’ compliance costs and states’
administrative and enforcement costs, every state deviates somewhat
from the federal tax base.
1. State Autonomy and Regulatory Diversity. Decoupling helps
preserve state autonomy and regulatory diversity. A state’s ability to
remove particular federal tax provisions from its own tax base does
much to assuage the concern that federal-state tax-base conformity
substitutes national for state political preferences regarding the
content of the tax base. For example, earlier I recounted some of the
objections to the federal exemption of imputed income from
homeownership, including that it inequitably favors homeowners over
214
renters. Several states provide a renters’ credit that attempts to
215
balance the federal tax preference for owner-occupied housing.
Similarly, many states provide credits that expand or alter other
federal tax preferences. For example, by granting tax credits (rather
than itemized deductions) for charitable contributions, North
Carolina avoids the unfairness attributed to the federal deduction for
216
charitable contributions, which benefits only itemizers.
State tax deviations also reflect diversity in preferences among
the voters of different states. For example, many states use tax credits
to encourage parents to work outside the home, including by allowing
employers to credit expenses related to providing child-care facilities
217
to their employees, allowing parents and guardians to credit child218
care costs incurred while at work, and providing credits to two-

214. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
215. See e.g., CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17053.5(a)(1) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 235-55.7(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
216. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-151.26 (West 2011).
217. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 14–57 (showing that fourteen states credited
employers’ child-care expenses in 2008).
218. See id. (showing that twenty-two states credited parents’ and guardians’ child-care
expenses in 2008).
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219

earner households. In contrast, Utah provides a tax credit for stay220
at-home parenting. The content of these tax incentives reflect
differences in the values of the residents of different states.
States even deviate from structural provisions of the federal tax
law when those structural provisions clash with the values of state
residents. For example, states that recognize same-sex marriages or
same-sex domestic partnerships deviate from the federal practice of
221
denying same-sex couples the ability to file joint tax returns.
2. Accountability. The option to decouple from the federal tax
base also mitigates the concern that tax-base conformity undermines
political accountability by causing voters improperly to blame state
legislators for federal-level tax policy choices. When individual
provisions of the federal tax law can be incorporated—or not—into
the state tax base on an item-by-item basis, it is appropriate for state
voters to hold state legislators to account for the items that state
legislators choose to incorporate, as well as those they choose to leave
out. In this respect, we can distinguish tax-base conformity from
conditional grants, which may be offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
and from federal commandeering, which gives states no choice
222
whatsoever.
The requirement that state residents calculate their state-taxable
income using separate tax forms also lessens accountability problems

219. See id. at 46–57 (showing that four states credited two-earner households in 2008).
220. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-1005 (LexisNexis 2011) (providing tax credit for “[a]thome parent[s]” who care for their own infant in their own home, and stating that the “[a]thome” parent’s earned income must not exceed $3000 for the year).
221. Kevin McCormally, Tax Savings for Domestic Partners: Seven States and the District of
Columbia Now Allow Same-Sex Couples To File Joint Returns, KIPLINGER (Jan. 2009),
http://www.kiplinger.com/features/archives/2008/01/domestic-partner-joint-tax-returns.html; see
also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that in 2009, six states allowed registered
domestic partners or civil-union partners to elect whether to file jointly or separately).
222. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Some commentators argue that it is
perfectly appropriate for state voters to hold state representatives accountable for the terms of
conditional grants because state legislators accept the conditions attached to grants. These
commentators presumably also would conclude that state legislators should be held to account
for the decision to conform the state tax base with the federal tax base. See, e.g., Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense
and “Dual-Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 825–27, 860 (1998) (noting that it is
difficult for voters to determine whether federal or state legislators are responsible for grant
conditions, but that “individual states decide whether to accept the conditions and apply for the
funds” (emphasis omitted)).
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arising from federal-state tax-base conformity. The presence of two
separate sovereigns, each assessing taxes separately using its own
forms, helps to alert taxpayers to the fact that federal officials are
responsible for the federal tax base, while state officials are
responsible for the state tax base.
3. Targeting Tax Incentives. When national tax measures are not
suitable to local conditions, states can deviate from the federal tax
base by removing a federal tax provision or adding a new state
provision. For example, as noted above, most states provide energy or
224
environmental tax incentives tailored to local conditions. Tailored
tax incentives include Arizona’s tax credits for water conservation
225
and installation of certain solar energy devices. These credits reflect
Arizona’s specific climate and geology. By providing tax incentives
for solar energy, Arizona can target its subsidy to an alternative
energy source likely to be especially effective in Arizona, whereas
because federal alternative energy incentives must be targeted more
broadly, they may subsidize Arizonans’ expenditures on alternative
energy solutions that are less effective than solar energy in Arizona.
States also can use deviations to meet state public health and
safety concerns. For example, beginning in 2000, Oklahoma allowed a
tax credit to restaurants that provided hepatitis A vaccinations to
226
their employees. The vaccination credit was one strategy in a publichealth campaign that helped move Oklahoma from having one of the
highest incidences of hepatitis A in the nation to having an incidence
227
below the national average. Similarly, tax credits in Massachusetts

223. The separate reporting approach taken in the United States could be contrasted with
the approach taken by other federal systems, such as Canada, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark,
in which the federal government collects the state income tax and remits it to the subnational
government units. See Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 70 (noting that the Canadian collection
system requires strict provincial conformity with the federal tax, but that provinces can opt out
of the federal collection scheme). Under such an assessment regime, state residents would
presumably be more likely to blame or reward federal lawmakers for the content of the tax
base.
224. See supra Part III.B.4; see also Evelyn Kim, Are State Green Tax Incentives Good
Environmental and Tax Policy?, 45 ST. TAX NOTES 29 (2007) (noting that thirty-eight states
provide energy or environmental credits).
225. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1090.01 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (providing tax credits for the
installation of water-conservation systems); see also supra note 156.
226. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.33 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013).
227. From 1995 to 2000 Oklahoma had a very high incidence of hepatitis A, usually either
the highest or in the top five of U.S. states. See DANNI DANIELS, SCOTT GRYTDAL &
ANNEMARIE WASLEY, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SURVEILLANCE FOR ACUTE VIRAL

MASON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1320

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/17/2013 6:54 PM

[Vol. 62:1267

and Rhode Island for residential lead-paint abatement reflect special
228
public health concerns that arise from older housing stock. Thus,
state tax deviations enable states to tailor tax incentives or tax relief
229
to local conditions.
4. Fiscal Stability. Decoupling also allows states to minimize
revenue shocks associated with substantive changes in the federal tax
law. It is not uncommon for states to deviate from new federal
legislation that narrows the tax base (as opposed to new federal
legislation that expands the tax base). For example, in the period
from 2002 to 2008 when states faced serious budget shortfalls, they
were significantly less likely to incorporate new federal corporate tax
230
expenditures. State deviations from federal tax cuts and federal tax
expenditures allow states to increase or maintain revenue levels
without having to raise tax rates explicitly. That state deviation from
the federal tax base may also increase (rather than only decrease)
state revenue also serves to distinguish tax-base conformity from
other intergovernmental fiscal arrangements that raise federalism
concerns, such as conditional grants, under which a state’s failure to
accede to federal conditions results in revenue losses for that state.
C. Entrenchment
This Section identifies some of the principal barriers to federal
tax base deviation, including procedural obstacles, increased
administrative and compliance costs, and political risks associated
with the high political salience of deviations. These and other factors
raise the costs of deviation, including for provisions that a state easily
can sever from the rest of the federal tax base. Additionally, some
aspects of the federal tax law are what I call nonseverable; they are so

HEPATITIS—UNITED STATES, 2007, at 12 (2009), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/
ss5803.pdf.
228. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 62, § 6(e) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2012); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
44-30.3-1 (2010).
229. Likewise, the tax incentives provided by many states for specific kinds of disaster relief
and assistance reflect the greater incidence in these states of those natural disasters. See, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2357.29 (West 2008) (providing credit for property damaged by a
tornado occurring on May 8 or 9, 2003).
230. Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 29–33; see also LeAnn Luna & Ann B. Watts,
Federal Tax Legislative Changes and State Conformity, 47 ST. TAX NOTES 619, 624 (2008)
(finding that as state unemployment rises, so do state deviations from the federal corporate tax
base); id. (explaining states’ goal to “protect their ever eroding tax bases” by decoupling from
federal corporate tax preferences).
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entrenched that it is impractical for states to deviate from them, even
if states would be willing to bear the other associated costs of
deviation. For example, because the realization requirement informs
so much of the federal income calculation, incorporating states cannot
231
sever it from the rest of the federal tax base. As this Section
explains, there is no necessary connection between the normative
desirability of a federal tax provision and its severability from the
federal income tax base. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that states
incorporate some nonseverable federal tax provisions from which
they would prefer to deviate.
1. Stickiness of the Federal Tax Base. This subsection identifies
factors, such as increased compliance costs and political obstacles,
that might discourage a state from deviating from federal income tax
rules, even when it is in the state’s interest to deviate. These factors
tend to make federal tax provisions “stick” at the state level,
notwithstanding states’ formal ability to deviate from them.
Disharmony Costs. Fear of eroding the benefits of vertical
harmonization discussed in Part II may discourage a state from
deviating from federal tax provisions. For example, deviations
between the federal and state tax bases generate compliance costs for
taxpayers. Although taxpayer return-preparation software lowers
compliance costs associated with deviations, such software does not
alleviate duplicative record-keeping requirements or planning
burdens. Deviation also imposes costs on the deviating state. Devising
and enforcing deviations requires the expenditure of scarce state
legislative resources, and it increases state tax enforcement costs by
reducing states’ ability to free ride on federal administration and
enforcement. Deviation also increases administrative and judicial
costs because states must interpret and enforce any deviations and
adjudicate taxpayer disputes without the opportunity to rely on
federal interpretations and adjudications. Notice also that a state’s
ease of deviation varies with its resources. California may have the
resources to administer a deviation that North Dakota could not.
Deviations also compromise the horizontal harmonization
benefits of tax-base conformity. For example, deviations could trigger
a competitive race to the bottom in which each state tries to attract
mobile residents by offering them expensive tax benefits. Deviations
231. For discussion of the realization rule, see supra notes 86–87.
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also promote tax arbitrage while at the same time impeding interstate
commerce by increasing tax compliance costs and the risk of
unrelieved double taxation for multistate taxpayers.
Information Gaps. Information gaps contribute to the costs of
deviation. For example, state legislators and voters simply may not be
aware of or understand the impact on their state of each incorporated
federal tax provision. Despite the implementation of heuristics
(including the federal tax expenditure budget) that seek to highlight
232
the regulatory impact of federal tax subsidies, the federal tax code is
voluminous and complicated, and no state legislator or voter can be
expected to understand all impacts of conforming to the federal tax
base. As the rate of change to the federal tax law accelerates, these
233
information problems become more acute. Overwhelmed with
information about federal law, state legislators and voters simply may
prefer to continue to conform, rather than conduct a detailed costbenefit analysis to determine which federal tax provisions harm the
state.
Signaling. State deviations from the federal tax base send signals
to taxpayers and others. In some cases, states send strategic signals
through tax-base deviation. For example, when a state deviates from
the federal tax base by exempting pension, retirement, and Social
Security income, it sends the message that it is an attractive place to
234
retire. Likewise, when states deviate from federal tax rules by

232. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2006), requires annual
publication of a list of federal tax expenditures, defined by the Act as “provisions of the Federal
tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which
provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” The purpose of
the tax expenditure budget is to identify, estimate, and highlight spending through the tax law.
For more on the tax expenditure budget, see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND
INFORMATION ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2–3 (2011) (providing explanation and history of tax expenditure
analysis).
233. Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REV. 913, 914–23 (1987) (describing historical work by
Professor Jon Witte that shows that changes to the federal tax law have consistently accelerated
since the introduction of the income tax in the early twentieth century); see also id. at 945–53
(attributing the increasing rate of tax change to changes in the federal legislative landscape, such
as lower incumbency rates both in Congress generally and on tax-writing committees).
234. In contrast with the federal practice of taxing up to 85 percent of Social Security
benefits, most states have deviating tax laws that completely exempt Social Security payments.
See SNELL, supra note 34, at 2–3 (showing that most states completely exempt Social Security
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allowing same-sex couples to file joint returns, they signal their
commitment to marriage equality.
In addition to sending positive signals, state tax deviations also
may send negative signals. An analogy with contract default rules will
illustrate. In a 2006 article, Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and John
Pottow analyzed instances in which different jurisdictions have
235
mutually exclusive contract default rules. They hypothesized that if
one of the defaults were more efficient than the other, then
contracting parties in the jurisdiction with the less efficient default
236
should systematically contract around it. Instead, when they studied
actual contracts, Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow found that
parties in each jurisdiction tended to stick to that jurisdiction’s
237
default. To explain this puzzle, Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow
argued that a party to a contract might not suggest deviating from the
default rule, even when the deviation would be favorable to both
parties, because the very act of suggesting a deviation might
“dissuade his potential counterparty from entering into the
238
In short, the party would avoid even efficient
agreement.”
deviations for fear of signaling that he was trying to trick his
239
counterparty by using a nonstandard term.
Professor Kathryn Spier also suggests that contracting parties
may stick to default rules or boilerplate contract terms to avoid
240
sending negative signals.
She argues that if, for example,
professional sports employment contracts typically do not contain
injury clauses, a player would not suggest including one in exchange
for a wage reduction for fear of signaling to the team that he has a
241
higher-than-average risk of injury. Professors Ben-Shahar and
Pottow go further and argue that if the default flipped, so that sports

income, while of the fifteen that tax it, only seven follow the federal practice of taxing as much
as 85 percent of it).
235. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 651, 675–78 (2006) (considering several default rules, including at-will versus forcause employment).
236. Id. at 672.
237. See id. at 675–78.
238. Id. at 652.
239. See id. (“The fear is that the counterparty will suspect that the proposer’s decision to
deviate from the norm and use an unfamiliar provision hides some unknown problem: in short,
that it is a ‘trick.’”).
240. Id. at 657 (citing Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J.
ECON. 432 (1992)).
241. Id. (citing Spier, supra note 240).
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employment contracts typically included an injury clause, the player
still would not suggest that the clause should be dropped in exchange
for a wage increase, lest he signal to the team that he intends to avoid
242
risks and therefore will not truly be committed to winning. Thus,
Professors Ben-Shahar and Pottow conclude that default rules might
stick—regardless of their content—because contracting parties draw
243
adverse inferences from requests to deviate.
Because state income tax bases are very complicated, most
taxpayers rationally avoid analyzing them closely. Thus, state
residents might not have a clear idea of the content of or motivation
behind state tax-base deviations. But the very fact of state deviation
may signal to residents and potential residents that the state is hiding
something. Indeed, state deviations make it difficult for residents and
potential residents to use the state’s tax rates in conjunction with their
knowledge of the federal tax base to estimate their state tax liability.
This asymmetry of information between the state and taxpayers may
heighten taxpayers’ fear of exploitation or surprise, discouraging
them from migrating to a state with a high incidence of deviations
244
from the federal tax base. State tax deviations also might send
245
negative signals about the characteristics of state government. For
example, a high incidence of deviation might signal state officials’
disregard for added taxpayer compliance costs generated by
246
deviation. Thus, to avoid situations in which taxpayers draw
negative inferences from tax-base deviations, states may avoid or
247
minimize such deviations.

242. Id. at 662.
243. Id. at 682.
244. Cf. id. at 664 (“[D]isinclinations toward deviance stem from a rudimentary fear of the
unknown.”); id. at 666 (noting that in experiments in which “adversaries (or even
experimenters) are perceived to have more knowledge or competence in assessing the
underlying risk probability,” decisionmakers “tend to feel more anxious” and seek to avoid such
situations).
245. Lisa Bernstein and Alan Schwartz have separately suggested that deviation from
standard contract terms may signal litigiousness to counterparties. Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms
and Default Rules Analysis, 3. S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71–72 (1993); Alan Schwartz, The
Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for
Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 397 (1990).
246. Cf. L.L. Ecker-Racz, Tax Simplification in This Federal System, 34 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 769, 774 (1969) (concluding in the late 1960s that “compassion for taxpayers” was
overcoming states’ “reluctance” to conform to the federal tax base).
247. States may acquiesce to a large number of low-dollar-value federal tax expenditures if
the cost of deviating from any one such expenditure is not worth sending the adverse signal.
Collectively, such provisions may amount to significant revenue losses and have significant
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States also might want to avoid deviations that would reveal
hidden information to other relevant parties, such as members of
Congress. For example, if a state’s congressional delegation
supported a federal-level tax benefit, the state’s failure to incorporate
that benefit into the state tax base may reveal to other members of
Congress that the benefit was less important to the state than its
federal representatives claimed. For example, federal law provides
tax incentives to the film industry, incentives that California’s federal
congressional representatives presumably favored. However, when
assessing its income tax, California deviates from those film-industry
248
tax incentives.
California’s nonconformity with federal tax
incentives that disproportionately benefit California may undermine
claims made by the state’s federal representatives that such incentives
are needed in the federal tax base to support the film industry.
Political Obstacles. Political obstacles may make it difficult for
incorporating states to deviate from the federal tax base. Some of
these obstacles are structural. For example, states that dynamically
incorporate federal law have no opportunity to deviate from new
federal laws until the state legislature is in session, which may result
in considerable time lags before deviation. Likewise, because some
states require supermajority votes to raise taxes, once they
incorporate federal tax preferences into state law, it may be difficult
249
for states to deviate from them.
The endowment effect also may increase the political costs
associated with state tax-base deviations. The endowment effect is the
tendency of people to ascribe more value to objects or entitlements

regulatory impacts. But deviating from many federal provisions probably sends a worse signal
than deviating from just a few.
248. See, e.g., Muntean, supra note 204, at 260 (expressing surprise that California did not
conform to federal-level tax preferences for the movie industry). California’s nonconformity
with federal legislation is less surprising considering that such federal legislation accomplishes a
wealth transfer from residents of all the other states to the movie industry of California.
Although California’s federal representatives would clearly favor such a transfer, it is not clear
that California’s state representatives would want to replicate that national transfer of wealth
within California, because at the state level, the transfer would be from all California residents
to California residents who are part of the movie industry.
249. See David Gamage & Jeremy Bearer-Friend, Managing Fiscal Volatility by Redefining
Tax Cuts and Tax Hikes, 58 ST. TAX NOTES 113, 122–23 (2010) (discussing supermajority
requirements); id. at 122 (noting that, due to the need for legislation to pass both legislative
chambers and avoid veto by the governor, state law proposals “typically require the support of
more than a mere 51 percent majority to become law”). This point suggests that once
incorporated, provisions of the federal tax law will “stick” in the states.
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that they possess than those that they do not possess. Experiments
have confirmed that the endowment effect attaches not only to
251
physical assets, but also to intangible entitlements. The federal tax
252
base may generate endowment effects. For example, taxpayers who
receive a federal tax benefit, such as the deduction for charitable
donations, may come to feel entitled to that tax benefit, such that they
value it more than the dollar amount of tax savings that it generates.
This sense of entitlement would make the deduction difficult to
repeal at the federal level. Similarly, if taxpayers regard the federal
tax base as embodying a set of good practices to which most states
conform, it could create the expectation that the same tax benefits
253
should be available at the state level.
Even if state residents do not regard the federal tax base as
embodying a set of good practices, such that they did not initially
expect the state tax base to match the federal tax base, once states
incorporate federal tax benefits, the endowment effect would make it
more difficult politically for state legislators to drop those benefits in
the future. The endowment effect therefore could make federal tax
preferences sticky for incorporating states, even if the application of a
federal tax benefit in a particular state is inefficient or poorly tailored,
and even if its initial incorporation was by chance, for convenience, or
because the state failed to conduct a thorough cost-benefits analysis
of the federal tax benefit before incorporating it. Thus, once
incorporated, federal tax benefits might stick without respect to
whether they are efficient at the state level. Moreover, the

250. Daniel Kahneman and fellow researchers conducted a famous experiment in which
college students who were given a mug demanded a higher price to sell it, on average, than did
college students who were given six dollars instead of a mug and asked how much they would
pay for the mug. The difference in the selling price for mug owners compared to the buying
price for mug non-owners provides evidence of the endowment effect. See Daniel Kahneman,
Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–34 (1990).
251. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608, 625–47 (1998) (conducting experiments involving contract default rules and reviewing
evidence from experiments involving investment-portfolio allocations, job benefits, and
electricity service); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106,
113–14 (2002) (summarizing his experiment showing that the endowment effect attaches to
vacation time).
252. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1035 (2011)
(positing that the endowment effect applies to current tax benefits).
253. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 251, at 109 n.11 (noting in the default rules context that
“[s]ocial scientists have yet to sort out the relationship between this legitimating effect and the
endowment effect”).
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endowment effect might help explain why states like Arizona and
Georgia have adopted their own tailored environmental tax credits in
addition to, rather than as a substitute for, federal green tax
254
preferences.
Another reason state legislators may avoid deviating from
federal tax benefits is that the high political salience of such
deviations makes them politically risky. Most state taxpayers
probably learn about the content of their state’s deviations from the
federal tax base through their experience filling out state tax forms.
To undo a federal tax benefit, such as an exemption or deduction, a
state must employ an add-back, or addition. Specifically, the state
must instruct the taxpayer to increase her state tax or taxable income
by the amount of the federal benefit. This procedure calls taxpayers’
attention to precisely what they are losing through the state deviation.
Even taxpayers who do not suffer an increase in state-taxable income
due to the add-back (for example, because they did not qualify for the
federal benefit) may perceive the state to be taking away upside
255
potential. Deviation from a federal tax benefit therefore may be
framed as a tax increase, even if the state never adopted the federal
tax benefit in the first place. In contrast, if state legislators devised the
state income tax base from a blank slate, taxpayers would be unlikely
to consider all of the possible exemptions and deductions that their
state could grant, but does not. That is, if states worked from a blank
slate, inconsistencies between the state and federal tax bases would
not be framed as state tax increases.
The inability to deviate quietly from the federal tax base could
explain why some states have chosen not to incorporate federal law.
For example, Pennsylvania is a facially nonconforming state; it does
not expressly incorporate either federal AGI or federal taxable

254. Arizona has deviating tax credits to support solar energy and Georgia has deviating
credits to reduce air pollution. See OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 15 (indicating no Arizona
deviations from federal environmental tax incentives, but noting credits for business investment
in solar energy, water conservation, and electric-vehicle-recharge outlets); id. at 22 (indicating
no Georgia deviations from federal environmental tax incentives, but noting state-level
environmental tax credits for, inter alia, diesel-particulate emission-reduction equipment,
electric-vehicle chargers, and low-emission vehicles).
255. Arguably, a state taxpayer should be glad that her state does not incorporate federal
tax preferences for which she does not qualify, given that state deviation from the benefit will
tend to shift the state tax burden away from her and toward fellow state residents who qualified
for the benefit at the federal level. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to conclude that instead
such a voter would feel regret that she will not be able to take advantage of the deduction at the
state level in a later year.
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income as the starting point for its income calculations. However, its
taxable base ends up looking like federal AGI minus federal abovethe-line deductions, such as those for IRA contributions, selfemployed health-insurance premiums, higher education expenses,
257
teacher’s expenses, and student-loan interest. If, instead of enacting
a facially nonconforming tax base, Pennsylvania used federal AGI
and then required state taxpayers to add back the federal above-theline deductions, it would draw more attention to the fact that
Pennsylvania disallows these benefits. Thus, the desire to obscure its
broad income tax base may have motivated Pennsylvania’s legislature
258
to reject explicit federal-state tax-base conformity. For states that
do conform explicitly, however, the desire to avoid what might be
called “noisy withdrawals” from federal tax benefits may reduce the
incidence of deviation.
In addition to making state tax deviations that claw back federallevel tax benefits politically riskier, the heightened salience associated
with state tax deviations may result in greater political rewards for
deviations that taxpayers approve of. Thus, the high salience of
deviating state tax benefits may explain why so many state deviations
from the federal tax base take the form of tax benefits unavailable at
259
the federal level. More generally, state voters may hold state
legislators to account more for tax provisions that the state legislators
specifically choose than for those they simply incorporate from the
260
federal government.
2. Nonseverable Default Rules. Even when state legislators and
residents are willing to pay the political, administrative, financial, and
256. See supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
257. See PA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, FORM PA-40, PENNSYLVANIA INCOME TAX RETURN
FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS 1–2 (2010); see also OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17, at 49 (describing
the major differences between the federal tax base and the Pennsylvania tax base).
258. The text should not be understood as making an argument against broad income tax
bases; on the contrary, most commentators advocate broadening the federal tax base. See
generally Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970) (advocating a
broad tax base shorn of policy-motivated tax incentives).
259. See generally OLIN & SWAIN, supra note 17.
260. Behavioral research finds support for the notion that people perceive action differently
than inaction. See Korobkin, supra note 251, at 625 & nn.53–56 (citing behavioral experiments
supporting the existence of the “status quo bias,” which is the notion that “people systematically
favor maintaining a state of affairs that they perceive as being the status quo rather than
switching to an alternative state, all else being equal”); id. at 657–60 (summarizing experiments
suggesting that people perceive it to be easier to control actions than inactions).
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other costs associated with deviations from the federal tax base
described above, they still may not, as a practical matter, be able to
deviate from certain federal tax policies. Some federal tax laws simply
do not come à la carte; they are not severable from the rest of the
federal tax base. I label these provisions “practically nonseverable.”
They include many structural aspects of the federal tax law, such as
261
annual reporting without income averaging, the realization rule, and
262
the exclusion of imputed income. As discussed earlier, such
structural aspects of the tax law may substantially impact efficiency
and equity, but it would be difficult or impossible for states to benefit
from federal tax-base conformity if they wanted to change such
fundamental elements of the income tax calculation. Although
nothing prohibits states from deviating from practically nonseverable
provisions, the state tax base that would result from such deviations
would be so different from the federal tax base that the state would
substantially cede the benefits it derives from conformity. For
example, if a state moved from the federal realization rule to even a
partial mark-to-market tax regime—under which the requirement to
mark-to-market could be limited to readily marketable assets whose
value is easy to determine—the state would have to change significant
263
aspects of its tax base as compared to the federal tax base.
Moreover, as the calculation of taxable income at the state level
diverges from its calculation at the federal level, the state is able to
rely less and less upon federal resources, including federal tax
legislative drafting expertise, federal tax information collection,
federal enforcement, and so on.
Other elements of the federal tax law may be severable, but only
at great administrative cost. For example, state deviation from federal

261. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. States could tax some, but not all, kinds
of imputed income that presently go untaxed at the federal level. Whether states could
effectively tax a particular item of imputed income depends on a variety of issues, including
whether the state could easily determine the value of the imputed income.
263. Cf. Weisbach, supra note 87, at 103–21 (exploring some of the complexities that would
be involved in moving to a partial mark-to-market (MTM) tax base at the federal level,
including deciding which assets to subject to the MTM regime, addressing tax-avoidance
opportunities created by subjecting some assets to an MTM rule while others remain subject to
a realization rule, and deciding how to handle taxation of corporate profits). Any state seeking
to move to an MTM regime would face the same challenges. These challenges would become
more acute for a more complete MTM regime. See, e.g., Fred B. Brown, “Complete” Accrual
Taxation, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1559, 1618–72 (1996) (considering MTM tax-base design
issues).
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depreciation rules will result in taxpayers having a different basis in
the same asset for state and federal tax purposes, thereby increasing
264
record-keeping costs and making enforcement more difficult.
Likewise, recall the same-sex marriage and immigration examples
discussed earlier. The disparate federal treatment of same- and
265
opposite-sex married couples is not limited to filing statuses.
Rather, much of the federal tax law depends on taxpayers’ marital
status. For example, a word search of the Internal Revenue Code
reveals that over two hundred Internal Revenue Code sections
contain at least one of the following words: “spouse,” “husband,”
266
“wife,” “married,” or “marriage.” DOMA affects federal income
tax calculations by requiring such terms to be inapplicable to samesex married couples. Thus, to equalize treatment of same- and
opposite-sex married couples, states would have to reinterpret federal
tax code provisions to include same-sex couples and then recalculate
same-sex couples’ income based on those reinterpretations. To excise
every instance in the federal tax base of different treatment of sameand opposite-sex married couples would significantly increase
compliance costs for same-sex married couples and substantially
267
erode the administrative benefits of conformity.
Similarly, the favorable federal treatment of tax-resident aliens
268
permeates the federal tax law. As discussed above, federal tax law
recognizes only two categories of taxpayers: U.S. tax residents and
269
U.S. tax nonresidents. The definition of U.S. tax resident includes
not only all U.S. citizens and green card holders, but also any aliens
who satisfy a physical presence test. As a result, citizens, green card
holders, and other tax-resident aliens (whether documented or
undocumented) receive nearly identical treatment under the federal
tax law. To avoid incorporating tax advantages for undocumented
immigrants into their own tax bases, states would either have to add
264. See DUNCAN, supra note 48, para. 7.4 (arguing that states find it “effectively
impossible” not to conform to federal timing rules).
265. See supra notes 124–133 and accompanying text.
266. This search was performed on Title 26 of the U.S. Code in Westlaw.
267. See Tara Siegel Bernard, Some Tax Breaks Unavailable to Same-Sex Couples, N.Y.
TIMES BUCKS BLOG, (Apr. 16, 2012 10:30 AM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/
some-tax-breaks-unavailable-to-same-sex-couples (describing burdens on same-sex married
couples to create “dummy” joint federal tax returns to calculate their state income tax liability).
268. A word search of Title 26 of the U.S. Code on Westlaw reveals that over 250 Internal
Revenue Code sections contain at least one of the following words: “alien,” “resident,” or
“nonresident.”
269. See supra notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
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exceptions for each federal tax expenditure provision they
incorporate, or they would have to subdivide the “U.S. tax resident”
category of federal taxpayers. Not only might such deviations raise
270
but they also would seriously
federal preemption questions,
jeopardize the state’s ability to free ride on federal enforcement and
interpretive efforts.
As scholars have long recognized in the contracts context,
immutable rules—those the parties cannot contract around—should
271
have strong normative justifications.
For example, immutable
contract rules may be designed to protect third parties from the
adverse effects of contracts. Immutable tax rules also should have
strong normative justifications. Some nonseverable aspects of the
federal tax law have a strong normative basis. For example, the
federal tax law generally does not draw distinctions between
taxpayers on the basis of race, sex, or national origin. But other
nonseverable federal tax provisions have weaker normative support.
For example, federal reliance on realization and annual filing without
272
income averaging reflect administrative convenience, but they
compromise the distributional fairness of the tax system.
Unfortunately, the degree of severability of federal tax rules bears no
necessary connection to their normative desirability. As a result,
there is no reason to think that the nonseverable provisions of federal
tax law are generally salutary or ones that the states ought to
incorporate. For good or for ill, they simply come with conformity.
VI. EVALUATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the disadvantages of tax-base conformity identified in
Part III, it is unlikely that states will fully decouple their tax bases
from that of the federal government. Indeed, several states consider
dynamic conformity with federal tax law to be so important that their
270. An argument could be made that the federal government’s plenary power over
immigration preempts state deviation from the federal tax treatment of tax-resident aliens. Cf.
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (invalidating on preemption grounds an
Arizona statute that sought to discourage illegal immigration).
271. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989) (noting the scholarly consensus
that immutable rules are those whose violation would be “socially deleterious”).
272. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L.
REV. 355, 355 (2004) (“There is a strong consensus [that] . . . a realization requirement is . . .
necessary due to the liquidity and valuation constraints of accrual taxation.”); see also
BRENNAN & BUCHANAN, supra note 179, at 1205 (“[A]n income averaging system would likely
be very complicated . . . .”).
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constitutions specifically permit it. And over time, more and more
274
states have adopted conforming tax bases. That only six states with
comprehensive income taxes do not practice explicit federal base
conformity reflects the judgment by state legislators that the benefits
of base conformity outweigh its costs. Only one state, Alaska,
abandoned conformity after adopting it, and that state completely
275
repealed its income tax. Assuming that federal-state tax-base
conformity is here to stay, this Part has three goals. It recommends
steps that the state and federal governments can take to reduce the
adverse impact of conformity, it considers the implications of tax-base
conformity for controversial tax policy issues, and it suggests avenues
for future research that would take account of tax-base conformity.
A. Policy Recommendations
This Section makes policy recommendations to the states and the
federal government for minimizing the disadvantages of federal-state
tax-base conformity.
1. State Governments.
Publish Tax Expenditure Budgets. To increase awareness among
state voters and legislators of the regulatory impact of tax-base
conformity, states should publish annual tax expenditure budgets. By
drawing attention to the existence and cost of tax expenditures, such
budgets would increase the accountability of all state tax
expenditures, including those that the state imports from the federal
government via base conformity. At present, data on the magnitude
of state tax expenditures are difficult to obtain because not all states
maintain reliable tax expenditure budgets, and some states do not
276
maintain tax expenditure budgets at all. States cannot rely on

273. Without such provisions, dynamic incorporation of federal tax law could violate state
constitutional prohibitions on delegation of legislative authority. See supra note 80. The
constitutions of twelve states provide for dynamic incorporation of federal tax law. Dorf, supra
note 3, at 110 n.14.
274. Cf. Hildreth et al., supra note 46, at 583–84 (finding that state corporate tax systems
increased in conformity over the period spanning 1929 to 1989).
275. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 20.02 n.7 (Supp. 2003); Stolz & Purdy,
supra note 1, at 116 & n.289; cf. Ecker-Racz, supra note 246, at 775 (“[N]o state that has once
conformed its income tax base to the federal has subsequently abandoned it.”).
276. Several states with individual income taxes do not publish tax expenditure budgets,
including Alabama, Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, South
Dakota, and Wyoming. JASON LEVITIS, NICHOLAS JOHNSON & JEREMY KOULISH, CTR. ON
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estimates of federal tax expenditures alone because states also
implement their own tax expenditures and because the impact of
federal tax expenditures is not geographically uniform.
Prefer Static (or Lagged) Incorporation to Dynamic
Incorporation. The choice between dynamic and static incorporation
represents a trade-off between administrative convenience and
control over the state tax base. Although nearly half of conforming
277
the analysis
states have already chosen static incorporation,
presented in this Article suggests that more states should consider
doing so. Through static incorporation, states can secure many of the
advantages of tax-base conformity while avoiding the more serious
revenue shocks and democratic losses caused by dynamic
incorporation. Incorporating the federal tax base as it existed at a
fixed point in time allows state officials the opportunity to analyze
and debate the merits of new federal law before it becomes the law of
the state. Likewise, tax revenues are more predictable when states
elect to have a static tax base.
States’ inability to deficit spend, coupled with their inability to
adjust rates quickly to account for late-year federal tax changes, may
explain why so many states eschew dynamic incorporation of federal
tax law in favor of static incorporation, even though static
278
incorporation increases compliance costs. In addition to increasing
compliance costs, another drawback to static conformity is that
statically conforming states must regularly amend their tax law to
279
keep it aligned with federal law. Failure to do so would result in
divergence between the state and federal tax base that would erode

BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROMOTING STATE BUDGET ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH
TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING 5 (2009), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-9-09sfp.pdf
(estimating that state tax expenditures “cost states tens, perhaps hundreds, of billions of dollars
per year in forgone revenue”). Most states with individual income taxes publish tax expenditure
budgets, although the data they provide is often incomplete. See id. at 1.
277. See DUNCAN, supra note 48, para. 3.4.3 (reporting that seventeen states have “fixeddate” conformity).
278. See, e.g., Stolz & Purdy, supra note 1, at 120 & n.307 (describing how Oregon switched
to static incorporation after federal base changes under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 1972, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), left it with a $30
million revenue shortfall).
279. See Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 29 (summarizing a study of states’ decisions
to conform or not with eleven major federal tax initiatives enacted from 2002 to 2008 and
finding—to their surprise—“no differences between states whose tax systems require
affirmative legislative action to decouple from tax changes implemented by the federal
government and those that do not”).
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the gains associated with conformity. As the New Jersey Supreme
Court observed, “unless the Legislature may . . . provide suitably for
the State’s immediate adoption of amendments to the federal laws
and regulations, the State’s policy of uniformity would, as a practical
280
matter, soon be defeated.”
To prevent significant divergence of state and federal tax bases
over time, states could adopt lagged conformity, with a period of
delay of one or two years to reflect state legislative rules, practices,
and session schedules. Such lagged conformity would allow states to
anticipate and plan for revenue volatility. It also would allow them to
observe new federal tax policies in action before deciding whether to
incorporate them. If newly incorporated federal tax incentives
become entrenched due to loss aversion, then giving state legislatures
more time to evaluate new federal tax incentives before incorporation
could represent an important improvement in state fiscal
responsibility. Of course, compared to dynamic incorporation, both
lagged and static incorporation would increase state administrative
costs and taxpayer compliance costs.
Incorporate Federal AGI, Not Federal Taxable Income. A
federal taxpayer calculates her federal income tax liability by
beginning with what might be called her “gross income less
281
exclusions.” This figure represents the taxpayer’s “gross income”
282
includable under § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, less any
excluded income. Items of gross income may be expressly excluded
by federal statute or implicitly excluded by long-standing federal
practice. For example, gifts and qualifying employer-paid healthinsurance premiums are excluded by federal statute, while federal
practice has been to exclude imputed income. From the figure
representing her gross income less exclusions, the taxpayer then
subtracts her above-the-line deductions to arrive at AGI. From AGI,
the taxpayer subtracts personal exemptions and standard or itemized
283
deductions to arrive at her taxable income. Finally, she applies the

280. State v. Hotel Bar Foods, 112 A.2d 726, 732 (N.J. 1955).
281. The Form 1040 labels this figure “total income” on line 22, but the term “total income”
does not appear in the Internal Revenue Code and therefore does not represent a term that
states could incorporate into their own tax law. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205,
at 1 l. 22.
282. That is, her “gross income from whatever source derived.” I.R.C. § 61 (2006).
283. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, at 2 ll. 40–42.
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federal tax rates to her taxable income to calculate her federal tax
284
liability. Only then does she apply any available federal tax credits.
When states conform earlier in the federal income tax
calculation, they tend to incorporate fewer regulatory federal tax
provisions, whereas when states conform later in the calculation, they
tend to incorporate more regulatory federal tax provisions. Thus, the
point at which states conform to the federal income tax calculation
matters. For example, states that conform with the federal definition
of AGI import into state law federal exclusions and above-the-line
deductions, but not federal itemized deductions. In contrast, states
that conform with the federal definition of taxable income
incorporate not only federal exclusions and above-the-line
deductions, but also federal itemized deductions, many of which have
285
regulatory goals. Thus, to minimize the disadvantages of tax-base
conformity, states should incorporate the federal definition of AGI,
rather than the federal definition of taxable income.
Notice, however, that even if states conform with AGI, rather
than taxable income, they cannot entirely avoid importing federal tax
policies into their own tax bases because federal AGI reflects federal
286
exclusions that may have regulatory effects. Excluded items of
income, such as gifts or employer-paid health-insurance premiums,
appear nowhere on a taxpayer’s federal Form 1040. The taxpayer
simply omits reporting such income. Some of the most expensive

284. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
285. Above-the-line deductions include, inter alia, deductions for qualified payments of
educator expenses, moving expenses, self-employment taxes, self-employed health-insurance
premiums, alimony, IRA contributions, student-loan interest, tuition and fees. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 205, at 1 ll. 23–37 (listing deductions from gross income whose
subtraction yields “adjusted gross income” on line 37). Itemized deductions include, inter alia,
qualified medical and dental expenses, state and local taxes, home mortgage interest, and gifts
to charity. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SCHEDULE A (FORM 1040) (2012),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1040sa.pdf (requiring itemization of these deductions
for reporting purposes).
286. There is no administrable point earlier than AGI at which states could conform with
the federal calculation of income. Although the federal Form 1040 labels as “total income” the
figure that I refer to as “gross income less exclusions,” the term “total income” is not defined by
the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore it cannot easily be incorporated by reference into
state law. Whereas the term “gross income” appears in § 61 of the Internal Revenue Code, that
amount appears nowhere on the federal tax form, and therefore it would not be an
administratively convenient point of conformity.
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federal tax expenditures are structured as exclusions, but it is difficult
287
for incorporating states to deviate from them.
To reverse the effect of exclusions, states would have to direct
taxpayers to add back excluded items of income. How difficult a task
this would be for state taxpayers depends on federal (or other
regulatory) reporting requirements for excluded items of income.
Whereas certain items of excluded income, including employer-paid
health-insurance premiums, may appear on taxpayers’ W-2 forms,
other excluded items, such as gifts, may not be subject to any federal
record-keeping requirements. It would be particularly difficult for
states to use add-backs to include items of income that are federally
excluded but not subject to federal reporting requirements.
In contrast, because states conform with federal tax law by
incorporating either federal AGI or federal taxable income, states do
not automatically incorporate any federal tax credits. As a result, the
default rule for federal tax credits is nonincorporation. This default is
good from the perspective of preserving state autonomy, because tax
credits, like above-the-line and itemized deductions, tend to be
regulatory.
Invoke the Political Safeguards of Federalism. Defenders of
conditional federal spending have argued that the “political
safeguards of federalism” adequately protect state autonomy from
federal encroachment, obviating the need for courts to review federal
legislation to ensure that such legislation complies with the strictures
of federalism. Under the political-safeguards theory, famously
championed by Professor Herbert Wechsler, judicial enforcement of
federalism is unnecessary because the states are fully capable of
288
looking after their own interests in the political arena. Modern
proponents of the political-safeguards theory argue that even though
popular election of Senators has eroded the traditional political
safeguards of federalism, new safeguards have arisen to replace them.
For example, Professor Larry Kramer argues that political parties

287. Of the top ten federal tax expenditures by value, six are exclusions. See JOINT COMM.
TAXATION, supra note 232, at 18 (listing among the top ten tax expenditures the exclusions
for: capital gains at death, qualified pension contributions and earnings, employer contributions
to medical insurance, Social Security Old-Age and Survivors Insurance benefits, unemployment
benefits, and interest on life-insurance savings).
288. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954).
ON
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protect states from federal encroachment by tying the fates of state
289
and national politicians.
Experience has shown that states can be effective at protecting
their interests in the national political arena when it comes to
taxation. For example, during the negotiations over what became the
290
base-broadening federal Tax Reform Act of 1986, proposals were
made to eliminate the federal deduction for payments of state and
291
local taxes. The states successfully defeated the most aggressive
version of the proposal, thereby ensuring that state and local income
292
and property taxes would remain federally deductible. Likewise,
when British tax-treaty negotiators secured a concession from U.S.
treaty negotiators that would have limited states’ ability to impose
worldwide unitary taxation against British companies with operations
in the United States, states successfully lobbied the Senate to
condition ratification of the treaty upon the requirement that the
293
offending clause be read out of the treaty. States also can use
preexisting organizations, such as the Multistate Tax Commission, to
294
The
help formulate their responses to federal tax policies.
Multistate Tax Commission is an intergovernmental state tax agency
charged with, among other tasks, facilitating assessment and
collection of state taxes and promoting compatibility among the
295
states’ tax systems. States also might arrange through the Multistate
Tax Commission for collective deviation from federal tax provisions.
Such collective action would counteract the risk that any particular
state, by failing to conform, would send negative signals to state
taxpayers.

289. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
290. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. (2006 & Supp. V 2012)).
291. See Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account for the
Concerns of State and Local Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L
TAX J. 631, 631 (2007).
292. See id.
293. RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES
¶ 7.01[2][g] & n.49 (2011).
294. See Hildreth et al., supra note 46, at 577–78 (“The preservation of state sovereignty
[was] not mentioned explicitly in the [Multistate Tax] Compact itself though it does appear in
statements made by Commission members and in Commission publications . . . .”).
295. See MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, THE MULTISTATE TAX COMPACT art. I (1967).
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2. Federal Government. The discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of tax-base conformity in this Article generates policy
implications for the federal government as well as state governments.
Calculate State Costs in Federal Tax Expenditure Budget. One
implication of the analysis in this Article is that the federal tax
expenditure budget underestimates the total revenue losses
associated with federal tax expenditures because the budget estimates
296
only federal revenue losses. A more accurate tax expenditure
budget also would estimate the revenue losses for conforming states.
If the federal government undertook such estimates, it would relieve
states of the burden of tax expenditure estimation, at least for tax
expenditures incorporated from the federal tax base.
Produce a Federal Tax Code Pocket Part.
The federal
government also could generate a simple list of changes in the federal
tax law each year, including both new tax provisions and repeals or
297
expirations of existing provisions. The current tax expenditure
298
budget could be used as the model for the list of changes. By
identifying the changes in federal tax law from year to year, the
federal government would assist state legislators and voters by
focusing attention on whether the state should deviate from changes
in federal tax policies. Thus, state legislators and state voters would
read the list of changes in conjunction with the federal tax
expenditure budget to help predict both the regulatory and revenue
effects of tax-base conformity. These steps would not only aid state
legislators, but they would also help federal legislators understand the
impact of federal policies on the states.
Consider the Impact of Federal Taxes on the States. Congress
also should explicitly consider the effect of proposed federal tax law
changes on the states. For example, the expectation that states will,
through incorporation, implement tax incentives identical to those

296. Likewise, federal outlay equivalent estimates for tax expenditures, which estimate how
much the federal government would have to spend to convert federal tax expenditures to direct
spending programs, also are inaccurate because they ignore the loss of matching state subsidies
through conformity.
297. Of course, changes to federal tax law are already publicly available, but reducing such
changes to a simple list, modeled on the federal tax expenditure budget, would make those
changes more salient.
298. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
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provided at the federal level should factor into the size of federal
subsidies.
Additionally, Congress should adopt policies that seek to
minimize the impact of federal tax law changes upon state revenues.
For example, instead of narrowing the tax base to provide fiscal relief
during recessions, Congress should prefer rate reductions. Under taxbase conformity, federal base narrowing (but not federal rate
299
reduction) impacts state tax revenues. States generally will find it
politically easier to simply maintain their rates in the face of federal
rate cuts than to raise their rates in response to narrowing of the
federal tax base. In this way, Congress could help the states avoid
300
fiscal crises.
Congressional contemplation of the impact of its income tax
policy on the states in these ways would mark a clear change from
current practice, under which “Congress regularly adopts changes to
the Internal Revenue Code . . . with little or no consideration of the
301
fiscal consequences for state and local governments.”
Consider Stealth Commandeering. Alternatively, in some cases,
federal lawmakers may consciously seek to exploit base conformity as
a low-cost way of implementing federal policy at the state level.
Because states incorporate most changes to the federal tax base,
incorporation represents a cheap way for the federal government to
influence state tax policy and to supplement the subsidies Congress
offers through the federal tax system. It is also worth observing that,
unlike conditional grants, changes to the federal tax base do not

299. In a written submission to President Bush’s Tax Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform, Harley Duncan of the Federation of Tax Administrators explained that although Bush
administration changes to the federal corporate tax base provoked significant state deviations,
federal changes to the individual tax base did not have as profound an effect because “the bulk
of the federal revenue impacts were associated with the marginal tax rate reductions and the
child tax credit, neither of which have an impact on states from a conformity standpoint.”
DUNCAN, supra note 48, ¶ 3.5.4.
300. See Stark, supra note 1, at 408 (arguing that the federal government has an “interest in
minimizing state fiscal crises”). Economists’ findings that failure of either level of government to
consider the effect of its fiscal policies on the other level may lead to inefficiently high taxation
provides further support for such a deliberative prescription. See Álex Esteller-Moré and Albert
Solé-Ollé, Vertical Income Tax Externalities and Fiscal Interdependence: Evidence from the US,
31 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 247, 250 (2001).
301. Stark, supra note 1, at 410; see also Luna & Watts, supra note 230, at 619 (“[T]he state
budgetary impact of a federal change is seldom taken into account by Congress.”).
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require Congress to transfer funds to the states, and because states
retain the formal option to decouple from the federal tax base,
congressional exploitation of tax-base conformity probably would not
303
violate constitutional prohibitions on commandeering.
B. Implications for Perennial Tax Policy Debates
This Section considers the implications of tax-base conformity
for controversial tax policy issues, such as the appropriate structure
and content of federal tax expenditures, the role of the federal
deduction for state and local income taxes, whether Congress should
employ legislative sunsets, and the desirability of federal consumption
taxation. Rather than disposing of these debates, tax-base conformity
considerations may further complicate them.
1. Tax Expenditures Generally.
Commentators have long
criticized the federal use of tax expenditures—especially those
structured as deductions and exemptions—on the grounds that such
tax
expenditures
are
inequitable,
inefficient,
politically
304
unaccountable, and add to the complexity of the tax law. The fact
that federal-state tax-base conformity duplicates those disadvantages
at the state level provides a new argument against using such tax
expenditures to incentivize behavior. Moreover, incorporation of
federal exemptions and deductions at the state level may introduce
new inefficiencies. Under conformity with AGI or taxable income,
the states effectively match federal subsidies structured as deductions
or exemptions, but the amount of each state’s match varies with the
state’s tax rate. For example, consider two taxpayers who each spend
$100 in federally deductible home mortgage interest and who are
both taxable at the highest marginal rate in their states. If one lives in

302. Through the federal deduction for state and local taxation, a portion of the cost of the
state-level match of federal-level tax subsidies effectively would be charged back to the federal
government.
303. See supra note 145. Under constitutionally permissible conditional grants, “[i]f a State’s
citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect to decline a
federal grant,” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992), whereas under
unconstitutional commandeering, “[a] State may not decline to administer the federal program.
No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.” Id. at 176–77.
304. See, e.g., Surrey, supra note 258, at 705 (criticizing Congress for using the tax law to
achieve nontax regulatory goals); see also Eric Toder, Tax Cuts or Spending—Does It Make a
Difference?, TAX POLICY CTR. (June 8, 2000), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/
urlprint.cfm?ID=410261 (“By the usual standards of tax policy analysis, tax expenditures make
the tax system worse according to the goals of fairness, efficiency, and simplicity.”).
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California, a state that conforms to the federal mortgage-interest
deduction, her state-level mortgage-interest deduction will be worth
$10.30. In contrast, if the other lives just across the Colorado River in
Arizona, which also conforms to the federal mortgage-interest
305
deduction, her $100 deduction will be worth only $4.54. Varying
subsidies by state tax rates only makes sense if elasticities also
similarly vary with those rates.
The federalism concerns raised by tax-base conformity also
provide new arguments to support the position that, if the federal
government will use tax expenditures at all, the preferred form of tax
306
expenditures should be tax credits. First, unlike exemptions and
deductions, whose value varies with state tax rates, tax credits have
the same dollar value for all taxpayers. Second, because they come
later in the tax-liability calculation than do exemptions or deductions,
it is easier for incorporating states to sever federal tax credits than it
is for states to sever federal exemptions or deductions. Indeed,
because states conform to the federal definition of either AGI or
taxable income, by default states do not incorporate any federal tax
credits. Instead, incorporating a federal tax credit requires a special
act of the state legislature. Congress therefore could improve the
equity, efficiency, and autonomy of state tax systems by favoring tax
credits over deductions and exemptions. Federal tax credits would be
particularly appropriate when there are likely to be regional
differences in relevant conditions, such that it would be efficient for
some states to incorporate the federal tax incentive, but for others to
reject it.
2. The SALT Deduction in Particular. Analysis of federal-state
tax-base conformity also provides new insight into the justification for

305. The highest marginal tax rate in California in 2012 was 10.3 percent, whereas in
Arizona it was 4.54 percent. See Nick Kasprak, Monday Map: Top State Marginal Income Tax
Rates,
as
of
January
1st,
2012,
TAX
FOUND.
(Feb.
27,
2012),
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/monday-map-top-state-marginal-income-tax-rates-january-1st2012.
306. See, e.g., Lily L. Batchelder, Fred. T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency and
Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 49 (2006) (arguing
that tax credits are more equitable and efficient than deductions and exemptions); see also ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX POLICY STUDY NO. 13, FUNDAMENTAL REFORM OF
PERSONAL INCOME TAX 62 (2006) (noting that in many countries, conversion to refundable or
“non-wastable” credits has been motivated by the concern of equitable treatment for taxpayers
with no taxable income).
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the federal deduction for state and local income taxes (SALT). One
effect of the SALT deduction is that it encourages states to impose
income taxes, or to prefer income taxes to property, sales, and other
308
taxes that are not federally deductable. Commentators have had a
hard time understanding why the federal government would be
309
interested in subsidizing state-level income taxation. But the subsidy
makes more sense once we account for tax-base conformity because
through conformity, states bolster federal policies implemented
through the federal income tax. This post hoc justification for the
310
SALT deduction, although not without its problems, seems more
311
persuasive than previously advanced justifications.
3. Legislative Sunsets. Whether federal-state tax-base conformity
strengthens or weakens the argument for federal legislative sunsets
depends on how those sunsets operate in practice. The federal
government has long employed expiration dates in tax legislation, but
it has only recently engaged in the controversial practice of using
312
sunsets to expire significant tax laws with large revenue effects. For
307. See I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006) (providing deductions for, inter alia, state and local real
property, personal property, and income taxes).
308. See Martin S. Feldstein & Gilbert E. Metcalf, The Effect of Federal Tax Deductibility on
State and Local Taxes and Spending, 95 J. POL. ECON. 710, 731 (1987) (arguing that the SALT
deduction provides an incentive for state governments to rely more heavily on federally
deductible taxes than on other sources of revenue); Kaplow, supra note 2, at 486 (noting that
because of the state and local tax deduction, “taxpayers will favor higher taxes (or be less
aggressive in demanding lower taxes)”).
309. For example, Professor Kaplow notes that the notion that the SALT deduction is
needed to compensate states for interjurisdictional spillovers is unsatisfying because the
deduction is not limited to taxes that fund state programs with interjurisdictional spillovers. See
Kaplow, supra note 2, at 480–84.
310. In addition to subsidizing conforming state tax provisions, the SALT deduction also
subsidizes deviating provisions. Thus, the SALT deduction does not discriminate between state
tax laws that bolster federal tax policies and those that do not. Indeed, in addition to subsidizing
state (and local) income taxes, the SALT deduction subsidizes, inter alia, state and local real
and personal property taxes. I.R.C. § 164(a) (2006). Taxpayers can also elect to deduct state and
local sales taxes in lieu of income taxes. Id. § 164(b)(5). State and local real property, personal
property, and sales tax bases do not derive from the federal government; thus, the federal
deduction for them cannot be explained by the theory that those taxes bolster other federal tax
incentives.
311. In addition to Kaplow’s criticism of the spillover argument, see supra note 309,
justifications of the SALT deduction based on equity have also been criticized, see, e.g., Galle,
supra note 2, at 807–15 (summarizing criticisms of equity justifications proffered for the SALT
deduction).
312. For analysis of sunsetting legislation, compare George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect
Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 237–39 (2009),
which argues that legislative sunsets promote fiscal responsibility by reflecting the true costs of
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example, Congress enacted some of the largest tax cuts in U.S. history
during the Bush administration, and those tax cuts were originally set
313
to expire at the end of 2010. If our growing experience with sunsets
reveals that the application of clear expiration dates tends to coalesce
legislative changes into a particular year (that is, the year when tax
legislation is set to expire), and that sunsets thereby lead to greater
predictability and stability in the federal tax law, then sunsets would
make tax-base conformity easier for the states, in part by giving states
314
advance notice of federal legislative changes. States with dynamic
incorporation of federal law would face fewer revenue shocks
because sudden changes in federal tax law would be less frequent and
more predictable, and state legislators could be better prepared for
them. Likewise, if sunsets lead to greater stability in the federal tax
law, states with static or lagged incorporation would see less
divergence over time between the state tax base and the federal tax
base. Minimization of such divergence would help maintain the
administrative and compliance cost savings of base conformity. In
contrast, if as a practical matter sunsets lead to greater uncertainty
about the content of federal tax law or to more substantive changes in
the federal tax law, then sunsets would increase the costs of tax-base
315
conformity. Our growing experience with sunsets will help answer
these questions.
legislation, with Kysar, supra note 252, at 1014, which argues that sunsets do not enhance fiscal
responsibility but do increase rent-seeking and the influence of interest groups.
313. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, §§ 107,
303, 117 Stat. 752, 755–56, 764 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011))
(providing a December 31, 2010 sunset); Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
of 2001 (EGTRRA), Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 901(a), 115 Stat. 38, 150 (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) (same); see also Kysar, supra note 252, at 1017 (noting the
size of these tax cuts). Most of these tax cuts were extended in 2010 and again at the end of
2012. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 101(a), 124 Stat. 3296, 3298 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2011)) (extending for two years the sunset of Section 901 of EGTRRA); see also
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, §§ 101–102 (2013) (making
permanent the tax cuts for most taxpayers, while letting rates revert for some taxpayers).
314. See Yin, supra note 312, at 232–33 (acknowledging the high rate of change in the
federal tax law but arguing that by extending sunsetting legislation before its expiration date,
Congress could “provide considerable stability and predictability”). But see Kysar, supra note
252, at 1063–65 (arguing that sunsets lead to more legislative volatility).
315. The temporary repeal of the federal estate tax provides a recent example. In 2001, as
part of the EGTRRA, Congress enacted legislation that phased out and then completely
repealed the federal estate tax. EGTRRA §§ 501, 901(a), 115 Stat. at 69, 150 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 2210 (2006 & Supp. V 2012)). EGTRRA also gradually eliminated the
federal credit for state-level estate taxes. The impact on the states of the elimination of this
credit depended on how their estate taxes were structured. For states that had autonomous
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4. Consumption Taxes. As discussed in Part II, tax-base
conformity generates significant administrative, legislative, and
judicial cost savings. Indeed, the ease of collecting revenue on a base
largely determined, administered, and enforced by the federal
government may have led many states to adopt income taxes in the
316
first place. If the federal government adopted a value-added tax or
any other broad-based consumption tax, the administrative
advantages of state conformity with federal consumption taxation
might lead states to abandon their own consumption taxes in favor of
federal conformity. By (mostly) refraining from assessing
consumption taxes, the federal government preserves this base for the
states, thereby ensuring that states have a platform for autonomous
tax policymaking. The notion that a federal consumption tax would
erode state tax autonomy probably does not constitute a decisive
factor in the debate over whether the federal government should
introduce a broad-based consumption tax. However, the potential
impact of federal consumption taxes on state tax autonomy helps
317
explain state opposition to federal consumption taxation.

estate taxes, elimination of the federal credit meant that state residents suddenly felt the
economic burden of the state estate tax. For states that designed their estate taxes simply to
“pick up,” or “soak-up,” the federal estate tax credit, the gradual elimination of the federal
credit also automatically eliminated state-level estate taxes. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 8, ¶ 21.01[2] (Supp. 2002). Even though EGTRRA changes were phased in over
time, only a few states amended their estate taxes to account for the federal changes. See
Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 667–69. This response could signal that the amount of
revenue from state-level estate taxes was not worth its administrative costs to the states, or that
states were waiting to see whether the federal credit for state-level estate taxes would return at
the end of 2010 when EGTRRA was set to expire. At the expiration of EGTRRA in 2010,
Congress reinstated the federal estate tax for two years, but it provided only a deduction, rather
than a credit, for state estate taxes. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 8, ¶ 21.01[2]
(Supp. 2002) (discussing state tax consequences of the federal legislation). As a result, for states
with “soak-up” estate taxes, the state-level estate tax was not automatically reinstated when the
federal estate tax was reinstated.
316. Stark, supra note 1, at 432.
317. See, e.g., Kathryn James, An Examination of Convergence and Resistance in Global Tax
Reform Trends, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 475, 484 (2010) (“Each [value-added tax]
reform proposal from Nixon to Bush Junior has met with a similar chorus of opposition:
. . . state and local government representatives were concerned about the balance of federal
taxing power and feared any intrusion into the sales tax area . . . .”). The states also have
revenue concerns about the federal government intruding upon a base previously tapped
exclusively by the states and localities.
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C. Avenues for Future Research
This Article’s introduction to the problems posed by the
pervasive practice of federal-state tax-base conformity suggests
directions for future empirical study. So far empirical research on tax318
base conformity and deviation has been “sparse,” and it has mostly
319
focused on corporate taxation. There exists little empirical research
on individual state taxation, and what little research there is tends to
analyze differences among states’ effective tax rates, or the impact of
federal tax rates on state tax rates, rather than analyzing differences
320
in tax bases. But the analysis in this Article suggests that studying
state tax bases would enrich our understanding of state taxation.
For example, if federal tax laws function as sticky defaults, in
part because of state legislators’ concerns about yardstick competition
or signaling, then deviation by a pioneer state could pave the way for
deviations by other states. Likewise, researchers should be able to
observe other patterns in deviations from federal tax law, particularly
among neighboring states that compete for residents. Interestingly,
except for Iowa, the states that tax income but do not expressly
incorporate a federal definition of income—states I have referred to
321
as facially nonconforming—fall into two contiguous regions. This
contiguity raises the question of whether competition for residents
322
among neighbors drives nonconformity. Likewise, the federal tax
law may contain regional biases due to the voting rules in Congress.
Because each state has two senators, regardless of its population,
sparsely populated states possess influence in Congress
323
disproportionate to their populations. As a result, populous states

318. Luna & Watts, supra note 230, at 624.
319. See, e.g., Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 291; Hildreth et al., supra note 46; Luna &
Watts, supra note 230.
320. See, e.g., Esteller-Moré & Solé-Ollé, supra note 300, at 257 (estimating the effect of
increases of federal personal tax rates on state tax rates but ignoring issues of base deviation by
assuming a hypothetical common base).
321. The facially nonconforming states are Alabama, Arkansas, Iowa, Mississippi, New
Jersey, and Pennsylvania. See supra note 39.
322. Pennsylvania and New Jersey share a border, and Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi
form another continuous region of facial nonconformity.
323. See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the
Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 528–29 (2009) (noting that although the population of
California is 32.3 times that of Rhode Island, its ability to form winning coalitions in Congress is
only 5.5 times greater). Professor Baker argues that “allocation of coalition-building power in
the Senate will importantly affect the distribution of special legislation—‘pork’—that Congress
enacts under the Spending Clause.” Id. at 530. She confirms this hypothesis with empirical
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may have more reason to decouple from certain federal tax laws than
do sparsely populated states. Populous states also tend to have more
resources and larger tax bureaucracies; these resources facilitate
deviation.
Patterns of state conformity and deviation also may reflect
differences in state politics and political processes. For example, if
states deviate from federal tax law when state preferences fail to
match national preferences, then we would expect to see more
deviations from the federal base when different political parties
324
control the state and federal governments. Likewise, if states’ ability
to respond quickly to changes in federal law affects their choice of
method of incorporation of federal law (whether dynamic or static,
AGI or taxable income), then methods of incorporation should vary
with characteristics of state legislatures. For example, state
legislatures that meet only biennially, or that have significant
limitations on their ability to pass tax legislation, may be more likely
325
to incorporate federal tax law statically. More generally, empirical
research could be expected to reveal links between a state’s degree of
conformity with the federal tax base and its other attributes, such as
its overall income levels, demography, geography, climate, and
culture.
In addition to empirical research on patterns of state deviation
and conformity, reliable estimates of the costs of deviation also would
evidence of each state’s “balance of payments,” that is, its contributions to the federal fisc
compared to federal outlays it receives. See id. at 534–36. This effect presumably would also
carry over to tax expenditures, as well as other tax provisions. For example, the federal
alternative minimum tax (which itself disproportionately disadvantages taxpayers in populous
states) takes away the federal deduction for the payment of state and local taxes, a deduction
for which taxpayers in populous states are disproportionately eligible. See I.R.C. §
56(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) (denying SALT deductions under the alternative minimum tax).
Differences in the extent to which state and federal legislative processes are subject to
counter-majoritarian pressures—from, for example, misapportionment or gerrymandering—
could also result in federal preferences that diverge from state preferences. In such cases, one
would predict a higher incidence of state deviation.
324. See, e.g., Morrow & Ricketts, supra note 174, at 28 (finding for corporate taxes “that
the political affiliation of the state legislature, but not that of the majority of the state’s voters
(as exhibited by the support of those voters for the president) is a significant predictor of the
likelihood the state will conform to income-decreasing tax changes implemented at the federal
level”).
325. See RONALD K. SNELL, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
EXPERIENCES WITH ANNUAL AND BIENNIAL BUDGETING 1 (2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/BiennialBudgeting_May2011.pdf (noting that nineteen
states employ biennial budgeting); id. (noting that four states hold legislative sessions biennially,
rather than annually).
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help elucidate the degree of entrenchment of federal law. Although
researchers have estimated overall state tax-compliance costs for
multistate corporations, they have not estimated state tax-compliance
costs for individuals or the cost savings for any taxpayers of state
326
conformity to the federal tax base. Without a clear measure of these
amounts, and without estimates of the incremental costs for deviating
from particular provisions, it is hard for states and state voters to
evaluate when their state could benefit from deviating from a
particular federal tax provision. Thus, more empirical evidence could
help quantify the costs and benefits of tax-base conformity, thereby
aiding states in determining whether, and to what extent, they should
conform to the federal base.
CONCLUSION
It has long been understood that by conforming to the federal tax
base, states conserve legislative resources and take advantage of
federal tax enforcement measures and other administrative benefits,
such as tax information sharing. This Article offers new insights into
the advantages of tax-base conformity: in addition to reducing
administrative costs, base conformity also facilitates interstate
commerce, reduces tax arbitrage, promotes interstate spillovers, and
discourages discriminatory state taxation. Moreover, because it
results in the states using very similar tax bases, conformity may
productively channel tax competition to competition over tax rates,
rather than tax bases.
But tax-base conformity comes at a price. By homogenizing tax
bases across the states, base conformity undermines both horizontal
competition between the states and vertical competition between the
states and the federal government. A consequence of this
homogenization is that state tax bases may fail to reflect differences in
the values and preferences of voters of different states. Moreover,
when states use the federal tax base as the starting point for assessing
state income taxes, they inevitably incorporate federal regulatory
policy into their own tax bases. By delegating tax authority to the
federal government in this way, states relinquish control over an
important policy tool. Thus, the impact of tax-base conformity is

326. See Duncan & Luna, supra note 47, at 667 (observing the lack of empirical studies on
the compliance cost savings due to base conformity).
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similar to other intergovernmental interactions, such as conditional
grants, that raise federalism concerns.
Of course, there are crucial differences between federal-state
tax-base conformity and conditional grants. First, states have greater
freedom to deviate from particular federal tax provisions than from
particular provisions of conditional federal grants. However, as this
Article argues, because tax-base deviations impose costs and because
not all federal tax provisions come à la carte, it is reasonable to
assume that incorporating states adopt at least some federal tax laws
that serve neither state interests nor state voter preferences. The
federal government’s accomplishment of ever more regulation
through the tax system exacerbates this problem. Another difference
between tax-base conformity and conditional grants is that the
pressure states feel to conform their tax bases to that of the federal
government does not emanate primarily from the federal
government. Instead, it derives from the need to compete with other
states for mobile residents who want to minimize their compliance
burdens. Likewise, states feel pressure to raise income taxes at the
lowest possible administrative and legislative cost.
The pressures to conform, and the benefits conformity brings,
suggest that federal-state tax-base conformity is here to stay. The
growth and persistence of base conformity reveals that the federal
government has far more influence on state taxes than is usually
acknowledged. Although scholars have long neglected tax-base
conformity, this Article shows that to fully understand our fiscal
federalism requires consideration of base conformity.

